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INTRODUCTION

Comcast Corp v Behrend' stands as merely one of the latest
battlegrounds on which critical class action issues have been
fought.2 The case is unique, however, insofar as it is the most
prominent battleground on which critical class-certification issues
will continue to be fought, owing to its ambiguity.3 To wit, interpreting precisely what Comcast stands for has proven a vexa4
tious task-stumping nearly two hundred lower courts thus far.
The class action mechanism plays a vital role in the American
adversarial legal system-it gets litigants into the courtroom.
Against this backdrop, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 casts
a shadow-it limits the use of the class action mechanism to
ensure that judicial economies are preserved. Rule 23(b)(3)especially its predominance requirement-is a crucial component of this limiting framework. Proposed "damages classes"
filed under Rule 23(b)(3) must demonstrate that questions common to all members of a proffered class will "predominate" over
individual questions. As a general rule, this inquiry has focused
t BA 2011, Harvard University; JD Candidate 2015, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 133 S Ct 1426 (2013).
2
See, for example, Butler v Sears, Roebuck and Co, 727 F3d 796, 799-800 (7th Cir
2013). For previous class action battlegrounds, see, for example, Amgen Inc V Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S Ct 1184, 1191 (2013) (Ginsburg) (holding that
FRCP 23(b)(3) "requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not
that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class"); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc v Dukes, 131 S Ct 2541, 2551 (2011) (Scalia) (holding that the commonality
requirement in FRCP 23(a)(2) requires that the class-wide proceeding generate "common
answers") (emphasis omitted).
3 See, for example, In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, 297 FRD
168, 180 (D Mass 2013) ("Now-into the wild. What is one to make of the 5-4 decision of
the Supreme Court in Comcast?"); In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone)Antitrust Litigation, 2014
WL 340903, *18 (ED Tenn) ('The exact reach of Comcast, including the extent to which
Comcast requires that a damages model calculate damages on a classwide basis, is a
matter of some controversy.").
4
See Part II.B.
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on issues of liability, while damages have been merely a factor to
consider. 5
Comcast, however, has cast the validity of this general rule
into doubt. In denying certification of the proffered Rule 23(b)(3)
class, the Supreme Court, per Justice Antonin Scalia, appeared
to suggest that general class action rules governed the Court's
holding and that individualized damages presented by the class
members doomed certification.6 Anticipating the potential sea
change that this opinion could precipitate in class action jurisprudence, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer
jointly filed a dissent suggesting that the status quo regarding
individualized damages remains unchanged.7 The result of the
majority's potentially novel reimagining of the general rule, and
the dissent's mitigation of that opinion, has been nothing short of
interpretive chaos. Circuit splits are building on circuit splits,
and district courts are even disregarding guidance set forth by
their respective courts of appeals. The question that hundreds of
judges, practitioners, and clerks face-What does Comcast stand
for?-remains decidedly unanswered.
This Comment begins with a brief background on class actions generally, and the role of individualized damages in the
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry in particular. It then addresses the post-Comcast chaos with several goals in mind.
First, it aims to sort lower court interpretations of Comcast into
one of four interpretive "bins." Second, it seeks to critique each
of these interpretive moves as descriptively and normatively
flawed, ultimately concluding that each bin should be cast into
the water. Finally, it suggests that an antitrust-centric approach
to Comcast provides the most accurate and desirable reading of
the opinion. In so doing, this Comment introduces a new treatment of antitrust class actions more broadly that simultaneously
advances the goals of both class action and antitrust law, while
preserving the general individualized-damages rule in all other
contexts. Specifically, this Comment contends that, in the antitrust context, only a showing of common antitrust injury across
the class satisfies the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry.

5
See Messner v Northshore University HealthSystem, 669 F3d 802, 814-15 (7th
Cir 2012) (discussing cases in which class certification proceeded despite concerns over
individualized-damages claims).
6
See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1432-34.
7
See id at 1436 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
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I. CLASS ACTIONS AND 'WELL NIGH UNIVERSAL" RULES
Two forces-the class action mechanism and the body of
regulations that govern that mechanism-are broadly encompassed in Rule 23. Class actions allow a collection of plaintiffs to
jointly seek relief against one or more defendants, ensuring that
litigants have a chance to get into the courtroom. 8 Rule 23 requires
courts to engage in a rigorous multistep analysis prior to certifying
a class action for continued proceedings, 9 ensuring that judicial
economies are achieved.1o Within this framework, a historically
prevailing rule is that individualized damages claimed by the
members of a proffered class are not dispositive of the certification question; rather, individualized damages are merely one
factor for courts to consider during certification.
A.

Class Actions and Baseline Rule 23 Requirements

The class action mechanism allows a collection of plaintiffs
to combine what would otherwise be many individual claims into
a single aggregate claim. Regulating this mechanism, Rule 23
embodies two countervailing priorities: getting plaintiffs into the
courtroom and preserving judicial economies."
Most fundamentally, Rule 23 permits representative plaintiffs to bring a single action on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals. This serves the critical plaintiff-centric goal of
class actions generally-ensuring that claimants, particularly
those with comparatively small claims, have their day in court. 12
However, Rule 23 also strives to ensure that judicial economies are preserved. 13 Importantly, it requires courts to engage in
8
See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 7AA Federal
Practiceand Procedure§ 1777 at 115 (West 3d ed 2013).
9 See FRCP 23(a)-(b).
10 See note 13 and accompanying text.
11 For an illustration of these dual goals, see Zahn v InternationalPaper Co, 414
US 291, 307 (1973) (Brennan dissenting) ("Class actions were born of necessity. The alternatives were joinder of the entire class, or redundant litigation of the common issues.
The cost to the litigants and the drain on the resources of the judiciary resulting from
either alternative would have been intolerable.") (citation omitted).
12 See Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 617 (1997) (noting that the
Advisory Committee wrote Rule 23 with small claimants in mind, irrespective of the absence
of a textual bar to large claims); Thorogood v Sears, Roebuck and Co, 547 F3d 742, 744
(7th Cir 2008). See also Joseph M. McLaughlin, 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law and
Practice§ 1:1 at 10-11 (West 10th ed 2013).
13 See FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments (noting that
Rule 23(b)(3) "encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies
of time, effort, and expense").
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a rigorous review of a proffered class prior to certifying the

class. 14 To attain certification, a class must both satisfy the prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a) and fit within at least one of
the class action categories enumerated in Rule 23(b).15 These
requirements impose an affirmative, and at times heavy, burden
on the proffered class.16

Rule 23(a) establishes four certification prerequisites, each of
which serves to ensure that the proffered class action would in
fact achieve gains in judicial economies. 1' Namely, the class
must: be so numerous in size as to render alternatives (such as
joinder18) impracticable, present questions common to the entire
class, demonstrate that the claims of the named plaintiffs are
typical of the entire class, and show that the named plaintiffs
and class counsel will adequately represent the interests of the
entire class. 19 These prerequisites are necessary, though not sufficient, requirements for certification.20 In addition, classes must
fit within one of three class action categories outlined in Rule
23(b). Particularly important for this Comment is Rule 23(b)(3).
B.

General Rules Governing the Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance
Inquiry

Rule 23(b)(3) provides for certification of "damages classes."
This form of class action is unique because the only bond among
the class members tends to be a common grievance.21 As a point

of contrast, Rule 23(b)(1) provides for certification of classes
when individual adjudications would risk conflicting rulings,
while Rule 23(b)(2) is concerned with classes seeking common
injunctive relief. Note that this scheme assumes the provision of
uniform relief for 23(b)(2) class actions-a vision explicitly omitted
from Rule 23(b)(3). In order to obtain certification under Rule
14 See FRCP 23(a)-(b). This threshold inquiry takes place prior to certification,
which, if issued, allows the class action to proceed. See text accompanying notes 17-19.
15 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Dukes, 131 S Ct 2541, 2548 (2011).
16 See id at 2551 ('Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party
seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate ...that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.").
17 See FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments.
18 See FRCP 20(a)(1) (noting that plaintiffs may join a proceeding if they were
harmed in the same transaction or series of transactions, as long as there are common
questions of law applicable to all of the plaintiffs).
19 FRCP 23(a).
20 See FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments.
21 See Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA FederalPracticeand Procedure§ 1777 at 116

(cited in note 8).
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23(b)(3), questions of law or fact common to the entire class
must "predominate" over individual questions, and a class action
must be "superior" to other available methods of adjudication.
This Comment focuses on the predominance requirement,
the goal of which is to ensure that judicial economies are preserved.22 The proffered class must establish that common questions are shared by the entire class, that these questions can be
addressed with generalized proof, and that any residual differences among the class members are minor. 23 Operationalized,
this requires the court in any certification proceeding to first
determine the substantive elements of the class's cause of action
and then to determine which of those elements are likely to
command a prospective trial court's time, attention, and resources. 24 To illustrate the burden that this imposes on the class,
one court has described the predominance inquiry as requiring
the class to demonstrate that there would not be a substantial
difference in the nature of the proof offered whether the claim
involved one or twenty thousand plaintiffs.25 Traditionally this
analysis has turned on two possible dimensions along which
commonality might be measured-liability and damages.26
Prior to Comcast, a general rule emerged as to what was
sufficient to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry:
common questions with regard to a defendant's liability.27 This
prevailing approach rests on the presumption that, when the
defendant's liability as to every proposed class member can be
addressed in a single trial, the class action device will achieve

22 See Amchem Products, 521 US at 623 (noting that the legal issues in the case
must be "sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation"). See also
Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1780 at 174 (cited in
note 8).
23 See Stacy L. Davis, et al, 6A Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 12:210 at
286-88 (West 2012).
24 See, for example, Simer v Rios, 661 F2d 655, 672 (7th Cir 1981).
25 See Windham v American Brands, Inc, 539 F2d 1016, 1018-19 (4th Cir 1976).
26 See generally William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:54 (West 5th
ed 2014) (identifying "[i]ndividual damages vs. common liability" as the main battleground in the predominance inquiry).
27
See, for example, Beattie v CenturyTel, Inc, 511 F3d 554, 564 (6th Cir 2007),
quoting In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F3d 124, 139 (2d Cir
2001) (holding that Rule 23(b)(3) predominance is satisfied "when liability can be determined on a class-wide basis, even when there are some individualized damage issues").
See also McLaughlin, 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 5:23 at 1270 (cited in note 12)
(defining liability as the "core" of the predominance inquiry).
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judicial economies.28 For example, consider a class of plaintiffs
seeking varying levels of relief for damages arising from an allegedly negligent toxin release. This class will likely obtain certification given most courts' determination that the fact-intensive
inquiry into whether the release was negligent will generally
predominate, even in cases in which plaintiffs' damages differ.29
That is, the proof offered by any one class member to establish
the defendant's alleged negligence will be nearly, if not exactly,
identical to the evidence that any other class member would
present. While each may have sustained different damages, the
majority of the court's (and litigants') focus will be on the liability
question-a question common to each member of the proffered
class.
The pre-Comcast predominance inquiry's focus on liability
necessarily relegated individualized-damages questions to a secondary position. Indeed, the notion that individualized damages
are merely a factor in the predominance inquiry has become an
ingrained feature of Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence.30 Returning to
the toxin example, this general rule means that courts would not
be terribly concerned about the fact that each individual member of the proffered class experienced unique harm as a result of
the alleged negligence. That is, until now.

28 See Mejdrech v Met-Coil Systems Corp, 319 F3d 910, 911 (7th Cir 2003) ("If there
are genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the claimants, . . . the accuracy
of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then it
makes good sense ...to resolve those issues in one fell swoop."); In re Methyl Tertiary
Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products Liability Litigation, 241 FRD 435, 448 (SDNY 2007)
('When liability can be resolved by a jury with a single decision that applies to the whole
class, and the only individual question left to resolve relates to damages, class certification is warranted.").
29 See, for example, In re MTBE, 241 FRD at 448.
30 See, for example, In re New Motor Vehicles CanadianExport Antitrust Litigation,
522 F3d 6, 28 (1st Cir 2008) ("Predominance is not defeated by individual damages questions as long as liability is still subject to common proof."); Arreola v Godinez, 546 F3d
788, 801 (7th Cir 2008) (stating that the "need for individual damages determinations
does not, in and of itself, require denial of ...certification"); Thorogood, 547 F3d at 748;
Chiang v Veneman, 385 F3d 256, 273 (3d Cir 2004), quoting Bogosian v Gulf Oil Corp,
561 F2d 434, 456 (3d Cir 1977) (stating that it "has been commonly recognized that the
necessity for calculation of damages on an individual basis should not preclude class determination when the common issues which determine liability predominate"). See also
William B. Rubenstein, 2 Newberg on Class Actions § 4:54 at 204-05 (West 5th ed 2012),
citing FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments (proclaiming that
"individual damage calculations should not scuttle class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)').
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II. COMCAST AND CHAOS: SORTING AND PROBLEMATIZING LOWER
COURT INTERPRETATIONS

In Comcast, the Court reviewed certification of a 23(b)(3)
class consisting of more than two million cable television subscribers that alleged various violations of federal antitrust law.31
Specifically, review was granted to assess whether the district
court should have weighed evidence tending to establish that
questions common to the class could be resolved on a class-wide
basis.32 In its opinion, however, the Court addressed the lower
courts' certification orders with a substantially larger question
in mind: What is necessary to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry?3
In reviewing the Court's answer, Part II.A will provide a
thorough analysis of the Comcast majority opinion and accompanying dissent, highlighting those aspects of each opinion that
have resulted in considerable lower court disarray. Part II.B will
then sort lower court interpretations of Comcast into four interpretive bins, a task increasingly necessitated by the rapid proliferation of diverse lower court interpretations of the case. In so
doing, this Part will also critique each bin. In considering these
critiques, note that courts in each bin frequently make two
important assumptions: first, that Comcast was meant to apply
to individualized damages writ large, and second, that it was
meant to apply outside of the antitrust context.
A.

Comcast: Two Ships Passing in the Night

This Section will begin with a thorough review of the procedural and factual posture of Comcast, focusing on the complex

antitrust issues in the case. It will then turn to the Court's resolution of those issues in Justice Scalia's majority opinion and in
the dissent filed jointly by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.

31 Specifically, the class brought its claims under §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act. See
Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1430. The alleged § 1 violation arose from the defendant's "clustering"
activities, described in Part ILA, which plaintiffs claimed constituted an "agreement[ ]"
between competitors not to compete. Brief for Respondents, Comcast Corp v Behrend, No
11-864, -1, *3-4 (US filed Sept 25, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 4467618).
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, through this practice, "monopolize[d]" the pertinent market, violating § 2. Id at *2.
32 See Comcast Corp v Behrend, 133 S Ct 24, 24 (2012) (granting certiorari).
33 See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1432-33.
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1. Procedural and factual background.
The immediate issue in Comcast was the certification of a
Rule 23(b)(3) class of cable television customers alleging that
Comcast had engaged in activities designed to suppress regional
competition in violation of federal antitrust law.34 Specifically, the
proffered class asserted that a series of allegedly illicit activities
constituted both an agreement between competitors in violation
5 and an attempt to monopolize the
of § 1 of the Sherman ActM
36
pertinent market in violation of § 2 of the same.
These allegations rested on the contention that Comcast had
engaged in strategic "clustering," a procedure whereby an actor
concentrates a regional or local base of consumer operations to
exclude competitors. 37 The claimed violations were supported by
evidence that Comcast had systematically purchased competitor
cable television operations within the pertinent media market
(Philadelphia and the surrounding area) by "swapping"-that is,
by exchanging its television operations in different regions with
those of its competitors in the consolidated region. 3s For example,
Comcast obtained Adelphia's cable systems inthe area by exchanging its own cable systems in the Palm Beach, Florida, and Los
39
Angeles, California, markets.
Having established the liability element of its claim, the
plaintiff class attempted to demonstrate common antitrust injury
and damages. To do so, the class presented four "impact theories" to the district court at the certification stage: 40 (1) clustering made it profitable for Comcast, also a content provider, to
withhold sports programming from competitors; (2) clustering
deterred "overbuilders," potential market entrants that build
competitor cable assets in markets where an incumbent operates; (3) clustering eliminated benchmark prices in the region,
making it impossible for consumers to comparison shop; and (4)
clustering substantially and artificially inflated Comcast's bargaining power vis-A-vis other content providers.41 Each of these

35

Id at 1430.
15 Usc § 1.

36

15USC§ 2.

34

Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1430.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id (noting that the class presented four theories to demonstrate both "existence
of individual injury resulting from the alleged antitrust violation" and "that the damages
resulting from that injury were measurable" using a common methodology).
41 Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1430-31.
37
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theories alleged that Comcast's antitrust violation had worked a
unique anticompetitive harm on the market. These four theories
were translated into an econometric impact model that purported
to demonstrate the disparity in consumer prices between the
allegedly anticompetitive status quo and a hypothetical world in
which Comcast had not engaged in the alleged clustering.42
The district court granted class certification but accepted
only the second impact theory (overbuilder deterrence).43 The
opinion made two moves that significantly impacted how the
Supreme Court viewed the issues presented by the case. First,
the district court repeatedly referred to "antitrust impact," never
once using the term "antitrust injury."44 Second, the district
court did not attempt to disaggregate the accepted theory of antitrust impact-overbuilder deterrence-from the plaintiffs' allencompassing impact model. Rather, the lower court embraced
the plaintiffs' kitchen-sink impact model after facially rejecting
three of its four components as corrupted by methodological error.45
A divided Third Circuit affirmed the certification order.46
While the court considered Comcast's argument that the plaintiffs' impact model was infected by the three dismissed antitrust
theories, it ultimately determined that this contention required
an impermissible (at the certification stage) review of the merits
of the case.4 7 Dissenting in part, and foreshadowing the Supreme
Court's majority opinion, Judge Kent Jordan protested that
the plaintiff class had not demonstrated "class-wide proof of
damages."48 Comcast appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the extent to which courts are permitted
to consider the merits of a claim at the certification stage of
49
proceedings.
Specifically, the Court granted certiorari on the ostensibly
limited question: 'Whether a district court may certify a class
action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show

42 See id at 1431. For a general explanation of the importance of these econometric
impact models, see In re LinerboardAntitrust Litigation, 305 F3d 145, 155 (3d Cir 2002).
43 Behrend v Comcast Corp, 264 FRD 150, 174, 191 (ED Pa 2010).
44

See generally id.

45 See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1431.
46 See Behrend v Comcast Corp, 655 F3d 182, 197-98 (3d Cir 2011).
47 See id at 207 (stating that this "attack[ I on the merits of the methodology [had]
no place in the class certification inquiry").
48 Id at 214 (Jordan concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49 See text accompanying note 32.
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that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide
basis. 50 In fact, the Court addressed a very different question on
review.
2. The Comcast majority.
The Court reversed the certification order as erroneously
granted under Rule 23(b)(3). 51 Scalia, writing for the Court,
quickly dispensed with the question on which certiorari was
granted.52 He noted that the validity of considering the merits at
the certification stage, when necessary to pass judgment on the
5
predominance inquiry, is well established. 3
Turning instead to more general class-action-predominance
questions, Scalia argued that methodological flaws inherent in
the plaintiffs' antitrust impact model rendered the Court unable
to disaggregate the sole impact theory accepted by the district
court from the unaccepted impact theories. 54 This raised a serious, and ultimately determinative, doubt for the Court as to
whether the proffered class could satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement. The Court noted that this disaggregation error resulted in a divergence of class members' damages to
such a degree that individualized-damages questions would
surely predominate.,, For example, the Court noted that the
"permutations" involving a class of two million plaintiffs, each
with a unique "theory of liability" to establish their individual
damages, "are nearly endless."56 It is easy to imagine that a
plaintiff residing in county A sustained relatively low damages
in light of the fact that benchmark cable-subscription prices
were publicized for her region, while a plaintiff in county B sustained particularly high damages in light of the fact that his region
had previously drawn significant sports programming from
Comcast. Meanwhile, an entirely separate plaintiff in county C

Comcast, 133 S Ct at 24 (granting certiorari).
Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1435.
52 See id at 1432-33.
53 Id at 1433, citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Dukes, 131 S Ct 2541, 2551-52 (2011).
54 Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433-34 (stating that there was "no question that the model
failed to measure damages resulting from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners' liability [was] premised").
55 See id at 1434 ("For all we know, cable subscribers in Gloucester County may
have been overcharged because of petitioners' alleged elimination of satellite competition
...while subscribers in Camden County may have paid elevated prices because of petitioners' increased bargaining power.").
56 Id at 1434-35.
50

51
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might have sustained moderate damages: her hypothetical
cable-subscription fee was elevated in light of Comcast's enhanced bargaining power over her favorite specialty content
providers, yet prices had already been elevated in her region as
a result of surging demand. The combinations are endless.
Therefore, despite the Court's acceptance of the class's contention that the liability claim was common among members of the
class, the Court concluded that the class did not satisfy the Rule
57
23(b)(3) predominance requirement.
This opinion raised two critical issues, each of which has
contributed to the lower court confusion that has taken hold in
Comcast's wake. First, the Court framed its opinion as concerning the damages element of the plaintiffs' claim. 58 For example,
the Court noted that the shortcomings of the plaintiffs' impact
model were important insofar as they rendered the class unable
to establish common damages.69 Indeed, the Court was clear that
"[q]uestions of individual damage calculations will inevitably
overwhelm questions common to the class. 60
Second, the Court presented the opinion as one applying the
basic principles of Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence.61 The Court noted
that, as a result of its finding that there would be substantial
individualized damages, the case "turns on the straightforward"
body of Rule 23(b)(3) case law,62 which generally holds that there
should be no class certification when individual issues predominate. 63 However, the Court implicitly rejected this substantial
body of case law, which specifies that individualized damages
are merely a factor in the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry.64
Though the Court did not directly engage this well-established
case law, it plainly reached a contradictory conclusion.
Rebutting the contention that individualized damages are
permissible in the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry, the
Court stressed its concern over the manifold damage permutations that a class consisting of two million members with unique
damages would present for any court. 65 Casting its opinion as
57

Id at 1435.
See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433.
59 See id.
58
60

Id.

61

See id.

62

Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433.
See Part I.B.
See notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1434-35.

63
64
65

1224

The University of Chicago Law Review

[81:1213

grounded in achieving judicial economies, the Court (potentially)
ushered in a dramatically divergent view of Rule 23(b)(3) under
the cloak of ordinary Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence.66 It was, presumably, a concern with this maneuver that motivated the dissent.
The extent to which the majority opinion turned on specific
antitrust principles is unclear. The Court confusingly chided the
dissent for discussing antitrust law while simultaneously
grounding its own opinion in antitrust principles. The Court
stated that the case "provides no occasion for the dissent's extended discussion of substantive antitrust law."67 However, the
Court later observed that damages potentially caused by "factors
unrelated to an accepted theory of antitrust harm are not 'anticompetitive' in any sense relevant here."68
3. The Comcast dissent.
The Comcast dissent recognized the possibility that the majority opinion would upturn the "well nigh universal" rule that
individualized damages are only a factor in the predominance
inquiry.69 As such, Ginsburg and Breyer went to considerable
lengths to mitigate the scope of the majority opinion.,0
The dissent began by arguing that the majority got the case
wrong as a matter of law. In light of traditional class action jurisprudence,71 Ginsburg and Breyer objected to what they viewed
as the majority's displacement of the lower court's findings of
fact.72 For the dissent, the district court's determination that the
class's impact model would adequately demonstrate the damage
sustained by each class member was both sufficient and substantively accurate. 73 That is, the dissent observed that, as a

66

It has been suggested in other contexts that, in recent terms, the Court has en-

gaged in the related practice of "stealth overruling." See generally Barry Friedman, The
Wages of Stealth Overruling (with ParticularAttention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99
Georgetown L J 1 (2010).
67 Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433 (citation omitted).
68 Id at 1435.
69 Id at 1437 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting). Note that Ginsburg and Breyer began
their dissent by arguing that the case should have been dismissed as an improvident
grant of certiorari, per the above description of the majority's treatment of the issue on
which certiorari was initially granted. See id at 1435-36 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
70 See id at 1437 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
71 See Part I.B.
72 See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1440 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
73 Id at 1437 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting) (stating that the majority's "mistaken
view of antitrust law ... relies on its own version of the facts, a version inconsistent with
factual findings made by the District Court").
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matter of substantive antitrust law, if three of the plaintiffs' four
impact theories were discarded as methodologically flawed, the
supracompetitive prices revealed by the impact model must be
74
attributable solely to the remaining, accepted impact theory.
Therefore, rather than yielding a multitude of damage "permutations," per Scalia's concern, there was only one possible explanation for the observed price increase-the accepted antitrust
impact theory of overbuilder deterrence.
More fundamentally, however, the dissent contended that,
even if the majority was correct as to the antirust impact dispute,
that dispute was of little lasting importance. The dissenting
justices sought to mitigate the impact of what could be a sea
change in Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence. Ginsburg and Breyer
instructed lower courts to cabin the scope of the majority's opinion. 7- Moreover, the dissent contended that the general rule with
respect to individualized damages in the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry remained broadly applicable.76 For the dissent,
liability questions were to remain at the core of the Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance inquiry77 The dissent cited a legion of cases sup7s
porting this general rule.
The dissent's instruction to lower courts to disregard the
central tenet of the majority opinion is paradoxical. 79 Indeed, the
dissent was clear that "the [majority] should not be read to require,
as a prerequisite to certification, that damages attributable to a
classwide injury be measurable 'on a class-wide basis."'80 One is
left wondering what the Comcast majority should be read to
require.
B.

Lower Court Chaos

The result of these dueling opinions has been nothing short of
lower court chaos. These courts are faced with a quandary: How
See id at 1437-41 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
See id at 1436 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting) (stating that the opinion "breaks no
new ground" and "should not be read" as a broad alteration of Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence).
76
See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1437, 1440 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting) (stating
that the majority's "ruling is good for this day and case only," given that the majority "could
not mean to apply in other cases" this interpretation of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
inquiry, and that the general rule will prevail in the "mine run of cases").
77 See id at 1437 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting) (stating that "the predominance
standard is generally satisfied even if damages are not provable in the aggregate").
78 See id (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting) (collecting cases).
79 See id at 1436 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
80 Comcast, 133 S Ct (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting), quoting id at 1430, 1431 n
4 (majority).
74
75
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should Comcast be read vis-A-vis the already well-established
general rule, particularly in light of the dissenting opinion?
Lower courts attempting to navigate through the haze of
ambiguity cast by Comcast can be broadly grouped into four categories. First, a handful of lower courts have applied Comcast as
broadly as possible, holding that, in all class action contexts, individualized damages are a controlling factor in the 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry. Second, several courts have seized on the
Comcast dissent's answer to the majority to largely disregard
the latter's holding. Third, many courts interpreting Comcast
have liberally applied Rule 23(c)(4)-which provides for certification of "issue classes"-to bifurcate liability from damages
questions. Fourth, a substantial number of courts have sought to
distinguish Comcast by explaining what Comcast does not stand
for. The courts in the fourth group are unified in appreciating
that Comcast must both mean something and operate within the
confines of general class action rules. However, each court in the
fourth bin has interpreted Comcast in the negative, finding that
it cannot apply outside the complex antitrust context. Therefore,
these courts are also unified in their reluctance to advance a
positive theory of what Comcast stands for.
This Section will review and critique each approach in turn.
The aim of this Comment is to challenge the various status quo
interpretations of Comcast in order to ultimately synthesize a
positive theory of the case. While at least one court has commented on the post-Comcast divergence,8' no court has explained
why its interpretation is superior.
1. The "literal" bin-broadly interpreting Comcast.
Several lower courts fall into a "literal" bin-those that interpret the Comcast majority's opinion as broadly applicable in all
contexts. These courts have interpreted Comcast as an expansive
countermand to the general rule governing individualized damages.8 2 This interpretation has been notably adopted by the DC
See Jacob v Duane Reade, Inc, 293 FRD 578, 581-85 (SDNY 2013) (collecting cases).
See, for example, Smith v Family Video Movie Club, Inc, 2013 WL 1628176, *10
(ND Ill) (denying certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class by interpreting Comcast to hold
that "damages must be susceptible to measurement across the entire class, and individual damage calculations cannot overwhelm questions common to the class"); Phillips v
Asset Acceptance, LLC, 2013 WL 1568092, *3 (ND Ill) (noting in dicta that Comcast "may
portend a tightening of class certification standards more generally, particularly as to
the circumstances under which the task of measuring damages sustained by absent
members destroys predominance under Rule 23(b)(3)").
81

82
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Circuit,83 in addition to a number of district courts. 84 This bin is
significant for two reasons. First, the lesson it distills from Comcast
is that any indicia of individualized damages in a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action-which is a near certainty--dooms certification. 85
Second, this bin's expansive interpretation of Cormcast applies to
6
a vast array of class actions, far beyond the antitrust context.8
Prototypical in both regards is Roach v T.L. Cannon Corp,87
in which the court considered whether a putative class of employees-alleging that they had been underpaid in violation of
labor and wage laws-should be certified under Rule 23(b)(3).88
In denying certification, the court held that Comcast dictated a
damages-centric Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry. 89 Of paramount importance to the court was the fact that members of the
class had worked different hours and as such would each be due
different damages were liability proven. 90 Anticipating this concern, the class's complaint provided a facile means of calculating
83 See In re Rail FreightFuel SurchargeAntitrust Litigation, 725 F3d 244, 253, 255
(DC Cir 2013) (noting that, before Comcast, "the case law was far more accommodating
to class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)," whereas Comcast stands for the proposition,
"[n]o damages model, no predominance, no class certification").
84 See, for example, Wang v Hearst Corp, 293 FRD 489, 497 (SDNY 2013); Smith,
2013 WL 1628176 at *10; Phillips,2013 WL 1568092 at *3.
85 See Cowden v Parker & Associates, Inc, 2013 WL 2285163, *7 (ED Ky) (denying
certification because "[p]laintiffs have offered no manageable way to calculate damages
across the entire class"). For a striking application of this principle, see Curtis v Extra
Space Storage, Inc, 2013 WL 6073448, *4 (ND Cal) (denying certification of the proffered
class of storage-unit owners-who alleged that the defendant illegally sold their properties
at auction-in light of Comcast because "[t]here could possibly be a dispute between each
tenant and defendant as to the true value of each item auctioned").
86 See, for example, Wheeler v United Services Automobile Association, 2013 WL
4525312, *5 (D Alaska) (denying certification of a class of plaintiffs-who were seeking
damages for alleged insurance fraud-given that, under "Comcast, certain categories of
cases, such as those involving 'significant personal injury damages,' are inappropriate for
class actions because of the extent of the individualized damage evaluations necessary,
which prevents them from meeting the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)");
Martin v Ford Motor Co, 292 FRD 252, 264-65, 288 (ED Pa 2013) (denying certification
of a class of vehicle owners presenting a mass products-liability claim); In re Montano,
493 Bankr 852, 860 (Bankr D NM 2013) (denying certification of a class of credit union
customers alleging fraud); Smith, 2013 WL 1628176 at *10 (denying certification of a
class alleging wage and labor law violations); Cowden, 2013 WL 2285163 at *1 (denying
certification of a class alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract);
Phillips, 2013 WL 1568092 at *1 (denying certification of a class alleging violations of
fair debt collection laws).
87 2013 WL 1316452 (NDNY).
88 Id at*1.
89 Id at *3 ('Plaintiffs contend that damages need not be considered for Rule 23 certification even if such damages might be highly individualized. This position is in contra.
vention of the holding of [Comcast].") (citations omitted).
90 See id at*2.
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damages for each member of the class: simply multiply the due
hourly wage by each class member's recorded hours worked, per
the defendant's internal accounting, then subtract what had already been paid. 91 Nonetheless, the court was unconvinced by
the argument that individualized damages are intrinsic to every
wage claim brought as a class action and easily resolvable as
such, holding instead that Comcast necessitated dismissal.92
This bin's literal application of some of Comcast's most severe
language suffers from two flaws. First, the literal interpretation
of Comcast fails to operate within the confines of the general
rule governing the role of individualized damages in the Rule
23(b)(3) inquiry. This is problematic because the Comcast Court
proclaimed fidelity to general class action rules. 93 The Court itself
(and Scalia in particular) recently acknowledged and embraced
the rule maintaining that individualized damages are merely a
factor in the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry.94 Notably, several courts in the literal bin have applied their expansive interpretation of Comcast in contexts in which the general rule on individualized damages is exceptionally well recognized. For
example, several courts have applied a literal interpretation of
Comcast in labor and wage law cases, 95 despite near-universal
application of the general rule in this context. 96 Similarly, a
number of courts in this bin have applied the literal approach in

91 Verified Complaint, Roach v T.L. Cannon Corp, Civil Action No 10-00591 (NDNY
filed May 19, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 3350417).
92 See Roach, 2013 WL 1316452 at *3, quoting Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433 (finding
that individualized damages "inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class").
93 See notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
94 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 131 S Ct at 2558 (Scalia) (stating that it is "clear that
individualized monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3)").
95 See, for example, Roach, 2013 WL 1316452 at *3; Smith, 2013 WL 1628176 at
*10; Wang, 293 FRD at 497.
96 See, for example, Shahriar v Smith & Wollensky Restaurant Group, Inc, 659 F3d
234, 253 (2d Cir 2011), quoting In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation,280 F3d
124, 139 (2d Cir 2001) ("Common issues may predominate when liability can be determined
on a class-wide basis, even when there are some individualized damage issues."); Williams
v Mohawk Industries,Inc, 568 F3d 1350, 1357-58 (11th Cir 2009), quoting Klay v Humana,
Inc, 382 F3d 1241, 1260 (11th Cir 2004) ("It is primarily when there are significant individualized questions going to liability that the need for individualized assessments of
damages is enough to preclude 23(b)(3) certification."); Shabazz v Morgan Funding Corp,
269 FRD 245, 250-51 (SDNY 2010) ("Any class action based on unpaid wages will necessarily involve calculations for determining individual class member damages, and the
need for such calculations do [sic] not preclude class certification.").
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fraudulent breach of contract cases, 97 despite the well-recognized
application of the general rule in this instance as well.98
Second, the literal bin's strict interpretation of Comcast, if
widely embraced, would toll the bell on Rule 23(b)(3) damages
classes because very few putative classes can establish uniform
damages. From an interpretive perspective, Comcast's alleged
uniform-damages requirement fails to account for the Advisory
Committee's intent in fashioning Rule 23(b)(3). For example, the
Advisory Committee Notes view that Rule as a means of achieving
judicial economies by quickly dispensing of like cases en masse. 99
At various times, the Court has itself been careful to emphasize
the importance of fidelity to the Advisory Committee's intent in
interpreting Rule 23.100
From a practical perspective, it is nearly impossible to conceive
of a damages class action involving perfectly uniform damages,
short of the plaintiffs manipulating damages claims or identifying
a statutory damages remedy. Constructing a perfectly uniform
damages standard for Rule 23(b)(3) would thus spell the end of
damages class actions for all intents and purposes. Theoretically,
and optimistically, this regime could yield a calamitous legislative scramble to manufacture an ad hoc structure of allencompassing statutory damages.101 Even if such a legislative
response were possible, there are plain public-choice dilemmas109 future victims will be less likely to identify themselves as such

97 See, for example, Cowden, 2013 WL 2285163 at *6-7; Wheeler, 2013 WL 4525312
at *4-5; In re Montano, 493 Bankr at 860.
98 See, for example, Yokoyama v Midland National Life Insurance Co, 594 F3d

1087, 1094 (9th Cir 2010) (stating that "damage calculations alone cannot defeat certification"); Allapattah Services, Inc v Exxon Corp, 333 F3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir 2003);
Gunnells v Healthplan Services, Inc, 348 F3d 417, 427-28 (4th Cir 2003); Alpern v UtiliCorp United, Inc, 84 F3d 1525, 1540 (8th Cir 1996).
99 See FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments.
100 See, for example, Amgen Inc v Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds,
133 S Ct 1184, 1200 (2013).
101 Consider Judge Richard Posner's observation that a damages-centric predominance inquiry might increase the need for a statutory damages regime for all manner of
cases, including, for example, commonplace products-liability claims. See Thorogood v
Sears, Roebuck and Co, 547 F3d 742, 748 (7th Cir 2008) (stating that claims for statutory
damages "might not require individual proof," but claims for actual damages leave courts
with the difficult task of "determining the relief to which the individual class members
are entitled").
102 In this context, "public choice" refers to the political economy of legislative enactments (though the field is far more expansive). See Maxwell L. Stearns and Todd J.
Zywicki, Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law 243-323 (West 2009).
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than future wrongdoers, rendering the latter better able to or10 3
ganize and manipulate the legislative process.
Moreover, the requirement that a class present perfectly
uniform individual damages creates a perverse incentive for bad
actors: injure more individuals. By increasing the size of the
class, the wrongdoer increases its chances of creating a variance
in damages. These are functionally "costless," or even netbeneficial, violations-no added victim is likely to pursue an
individual remedy,04 but their existence alone may suffice to destroy the perfect uniformity of a proffered class.
2. The "mitigation" bin-minimizing Comcast's importance.
Conversely, a second interpretive bin-the "mitigation"
bin-strives to minimize the importance of the Comcast majority's
opinion. Courts in this bin have done so by seizing on the Comcast
dissent while mitigating the majority opinion as carrying little
precedential weight. 10 These courts have treated the Comcast
majority's language on the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry
103 See J. Maria Glover, The StructuralRole of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in
Public Law, 53 Wm & Mary L Rev 1137, 1155 (2012) (noting that "public regulatory bodies
are potentially subject to capture by well-capitalized or politically influential interest
groups").
104 See Carnegie v Household International,Inc, 376 F3d 656, 661 (7th Cir 2004)
(noting that, in light of expected payoffs and litigation costs, "(t]he realisticalternative to
a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits").
105 See, for example, In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F3d 790, 815 (5th Cir 2014)
("Even after Comcast, [ ]this holding has no impact on cases such as the present one, in
which predominance was based not on common issues of damages but on the numerous
common issues of liability."); Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v XTO Energy,
Inc, 725 F3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir 2013); Reyes v Zions First National Bank, 2013 WL
5332107, *6 n 5 (ED Pa), citing Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1436 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting)
('Therefore, this Court interprets the holding [in Comcast] as placing an emphasis on a
court's ability to delve into the merits of a case to ensure compliance with Rule 23(b)(3)
and not on the necessity of proving damages on a classwide basis."); Munoz v PHH Corp,
2013 WL 2146925, *24 (ED Cal), citing Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1436 (Ginsburg and Breyer
dissenting) (certifying a class in spite of individualized damages, noting that "[o]ther
courts concur that the Comcast ruling does not break any new grounds under the Rule
23 analysis"); Gaudin v Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc, 297 FRD 417, 429 (ND Cal 2013),
quoting Rubenstein, 2 Newberg on ClassActions § 4:54 at 206 (cited in note 30) (granting
certification despite Comcast and noting that "[c]ourts in every circuit have.., uniformly
held that the 23(b)(3) predominance requirement is satisfied despite the need to make
individualized damage determinations"); Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, PA v Allstate Insurance Co, 293 FRD 287, 305 (EDNY 2013); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole)Antitrust Litigation, 297 FRD 168, 181 (D Mass 2013) (stating that Comcast's treatment of
Rule 23(b)(3) was "dicta"); Kurgan v Chiro One Wellness Centers LLC, 2014 WL 642092,
*7 (ND Ill); Haskins v First American Title Insurance Co, 2014 WL 294654, *15 (D NJ)
(noting that it is an open question whether the Court's treatment of individualized damages
in Comcast is "merely dicta or binding precedent").
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as "merely dicta," effectively reading the Comcast dissent as
part of the Court's holding.106 Moreover, these courts have begun
to rely on one another, citing a network of lower court disagreement with the Comcast majority to support their shared position.107
The most frequently cited case in this bin is Harris v
comScore, Inc,108 in which the Northern District of Illinois considered the certification of a damages class alleging that the defendant had collected Internet user data in violation of several
data-storage and privacy-protection laws.109 Critically, the court
treated the case as a run-of-the-mine class action: each plaintiff
had been allegedly wronged in an identical manner-presenting
identical liability questions-but sustained slightly unique and
individualized damages.110 Thus, the court relied on what it considered to be standard Rule 23(b)(3) predominance analysis,
concluding that judicial economies would be best served by certification despite individualized-damages questions."'
The Harriscourt rebutted the contention that Comcast upset
the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance analysis by utilizing the dissent's
language to mitigate the majority's holding as "merely dicta.112
For example, the court favorably quoted Ginsburg and Breyer's
assertion that Comcast "should not be read to require, as a prerequisite to certification, that damages attributable to a classwide injury be measurable on a class-wide basis." 11 Other courts
in this bin have justified their conclusions by quoting the Comcast
dissent's observation that "[r]ecognition that individual damages

106 See, for example, Harris v comScore, Inc, 292 FRD 579, 589 n 9 (ND Ill2013)
('The Supreme Court's [Comcast] holding came from its assumption ... that Rule
23(b)(3) requires that damages must be measurable based on a common methodology
applicable to the entire class ....That assumption.., is merely dicta.").
107 See, for example, Rosales v El Rancho Farms, 2014 WL 321159, *6 (ED Cal)
("Since Comcast ...district courts throughout California have [ ]determined that Comcast
does not defeat class certification where damages are to be calculated based on the wages
each employee lost due to the defendant's unlawful practices."); Quezada v Con.Way
Freight,Inc, 2014 WL 186224, *2 (ND Cal).
108 292 FRD 579 (ND Ill 2013).
109 Id at 581.
110 See id at 589.
111 Id, citing Butler v Sears, Roebuck and Co, 702 F3d 359, 362 (7th Cir 2012) (noting
that, prior to Comcast, "individual factual damages issues do not provide a reason to deny
class certification when the harm to each plaintiff is too small to justify resolving the
suits individually").
112 Harris, 292 FRD at 589 n 9, quoting Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1436 (Ginsburg and
Breyer dissenting).
113 Harris, 292 FRD at 589 n 9, quoting Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1436 (Ginsburg and
Breyer dissenting).
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calculations do not preclude class certification under Rule
23(b)(3) is well nigh universal."114
The mitigation bin suffers from two methodological critiques. First, courts in this bin are incorrect in asserting that the
Comcast majority's treatment of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
inquiry was no more than dicta.115 Note that the concluding paragraph in the Comcast majority is firmly grounded in the context
of Rule 23(b)(3) and the important role of damages in the predominance analysis.116 Courts in this bin selectively cull favorable
portions of the Comcast opinion as constituting the Court's holding
and disregard contrary language, thereby providing an inaccurate
and incomplete interpretation of the case. 117 For example, one
court within this bin reached its conclusion via a Frankensteinlike combination of the Comcast majority and dissenting opinions, perplexingly attributing the holding to the latter.118
Second, and dovetailing with the first point, this bin is itself
paradoxically grounded in an approach that it necessarily critiques. Courts in this bin broadly rest their approach on language in the Comcast dissent arguing that the majority could
not possibly have intended to undertake such a radical break
from existing precedent.119 As such, this bin's critique of Comcast
is guided by fidelity to precedent.10 However, courts taking this
view of the case disregard the fact that Comcast is also precedent.
While this avoids the literal bin's overreading of Comcast, it constitutes the equal but opposite sin of underreading the majority
opinion.

114 See, for example, Reyes, 2013 WML 5332107 at *6 n 5, quoting Comcast, 133 S Ct
at 1437 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
115 See note 106 and accompanying text.
116 See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1435 (holding that "Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize

treating [plaintiffs] as members of a single class").
117 See, for example, Shady Grove OrthopedicAssociates, PA, 293 FRD at 305, quoting
Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433 (relying on the Comcast dissent to argue that the case "does
not create a heightened standard for satisfaction of Rule 23(b)(3) predominance, but rather
'turns on the straightforward application of class-certification principles').
118 See Driver vApplelllinois, LLC, 2013 WL 5818899, *11 (ND Ill).
119 See notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
120 One of the passages in Comcast that is most cited by courts within this bin is the
dissent's collection of cases forming the bedrock of this precedent. See, for example,
Reyes, 2013 WL 5332107 at *6 n 5; Munoz, 2013 WL 2146925 at *24; Driver, 2013 WL
5818899 at *11.
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3. The "bifurcation" bin-utilizing Rule 23(c)(4).
Unwilling to embrace either extreme, a third interpretive
bin-the "bifurcation" bin-has sought to forge an alternative
means of bypassing Comcast via liberal use of Rule 23(c)(4).
Courts in this bin have certified Rule 23(b)(3) classes with individualized damages solely for the purpose of determining the defendant's liability per Rule 23(c)(4). 121 These courts represent a
hybrid approach-they generally accept that the Comcast majority
opinion carries precedential weight but find the Comcast dissent
more persuasive. Therefore, each court in this bin forges an alternative that attempts to accommodate both of the dueling
Comcast opinions.
Rule 23(c)(4) invites courts to bifurcate liability from individualized-damages questions, tabling the damages issue for
resolution at a later time.122 The goal of this "issue class" provision is to aid the judicial economies function of class actions.123
That is, in allowing for certification as to some but not all issues,
particularly complex class actions can be molded into a more
manageable form. For example, Rule 23(c)(4) has been used to
allow class-wide resolution of whether a defendant engaged in
practices having a disparate impact on the proffered class
members in violation of federal antidiscrimination law, despite
the fact that determining whether there had been intentional
discrimination-a requisite finding for a damages awardnecessitates individual treatment. 124
The application of this provision allows courts to functionally
bypass Comcast through bifurcation. The Southern District of

121 See, for example, Healy v InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
Union No. 134, 296 FRD 587, 594-96 (ND Ill 2013), citing Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1437
(Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting) (certifying a damages and liability class but stating
that "Comcast does not come close to saying ... that a class cannot be certified whenever
there are variations among class members' damages," and noting that, even if it did, "the
Court would have certified a liability-only class, as Rule 23 expressly permits"); Miri v
Dillon, 292 FRD 454, 464 (ED Mich 2013), quoting Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1437 (Ginsburg
and Breyer dissenting); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litigation, 292
FRD 652, 667 (D Kan 2013).
122 See 54 Am Jur 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices
§ 442 at 496 (2009) ("Bifurcation enables a court to certify a class action on the issue of
liability only.").
123 See William B. Rubenstein, 3 Newberg on Class Actions § 10:6 at 642 (West 5th ed
2013); Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 Wash L Rev 705, 772 (2000) (noting
that the "efficiency of bifurcation in multi-plaintiff, complex litigation is unquestioned").
124 See McReynolds v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 672 F3d 482, 491
(7th Cir 2012).
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New York embraced this position in Jacob v Duane Reade, Inc.125

In that case, the court considered whether to certify a Rule
23(b)(3) class of employees alleging that they had been systematically denied due overtime pay.126 The defendant's principal
rebuttal was that Comcast required dismissal at the certification
stage given that each member of the class had worked a distinct
number of overtime hours and was therefore claiming individualized damages.127 In considering this argument, the court remained keenly aware of both opinions in Comcast, assigning

equal weight to the majority and the dissent.128 Ultimately, the
court resolved the issue by reading the majority opinion through
the lens of the dissenting opinion-a task that in this case was
best achieved through the application of Rule 23(c)(4).129

This bin is susceptible to two critiques. First, courts in this
bin impliedly rest their approach on what is arguably a misreading of a footnote in the Comcast dissent. Specifically, the dissent's sole footnote indicated that, in some circumstances, Rule
23(c)(4) provides an avenue of relief for classes saddled with
individualized-damages issues. 13° This ostensible endorsement
of Rule 23(c)(4) has been the focal point of courts within the bifurcation bin. However, the dissent's endorsement came with a
crucial caveat-classes employing Rule 23(c)(4) must take advantage of the provision "at the outset" of the certification proceedings.131 This precondition reflects acceptance of Rule 23(c)(4)
as an initial maneuver, rather than a saving clause.132

125 293 FRD 578 (SDNY 2013). See also Johnson v Nextel Communications,Inc, 293
FRD 660, 675 (SDNY 2013) (declining to apply Comcast to a Rule 23(c)(4) liability class
because the class did not "run afoul of Comcast because individual compensatory damages
have not been certified"). But see Wang, 293 FRD at 497 (applying the literal interpretive
approach and creating an intradistrict split in the Southern District of New York). See
also note 84 and accompanying text.
126 Jacob, 293 FRD at 587-88.
127 Id at 580 (noting that, "in light of Comcast, [defendant] contends that it is axiomatic now that individual monetary damages claims of the class members may not predominate") (quotation marks omitted).
128 See id at 588 ('The dissent in Comcast seems to suggest that the presence of such
individualized proof with respect to damages does not act as a bar to certification.").
129 See id ("While Comcast surely requires some inquiry into the relationship between injury and damages at the class certification stage, this Court understands Corncast to require a linkage between those two, rather than forbidding bifurcation.").
130 See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1437 n * (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
131 Id (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
132 See McLaughlin, 2 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 8:2 at 391 (cited in note 12)
(noting that there is "general agreement that separate trials should not be granted as a
routine matter").
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Second, and relatedly, this interpretive response to Comcast
eviscerates the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry as a relevant
component of Rule 23.133 If courts are able to artificially manufacture predominance for Rule 23(b)(3) purposes via Rule
23(c)(4), it is difficult to conceive of an instance in which certification as to at least one issue common to the class would not be
achieved.134 It is worth noting that a circuit split exists on this
sequencing issue-that is, whether Rule 23(c)(4) must be deployed in the initial stages of the certification proceedings or if it
can save doomed classes from the jaws of defeat.13 Nonetheless,
the "at the outset" view that the dissent endorsed in Comcast
constitutes the overwhelmingly majority position.16 It is at best
unwise, and at worst unsustainable, to base an interpretive approach to a circuit split on a secondary circuit split. Finally, it
seems exceedingly doubtful that the Comcast dissent intended to
resolve this split, on which certiorari was not granted, in the
most expansive manner. 137 It surely cannot be the case that the
Comcast dissent stands for the proposition that every class action
presenting individualized damages could simply be certified by
use of Rule 23(c)(4).

133

See Michael J. Wylie, Comment, In the Ongoing Debate between the Expansive

and Limited Interpretationsof Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(C)(4)(A), Advantage Expansivists!, 76 U
Cin L Rev 349, 357, 371-72 (2007), quoting Castano v American Tobacco Co, 84.F3d 734,
745 n 21 (5th Cir 1996) (noting one scholar and one court's concern that this treatment of
23(c)(4) may "eviscerate the predominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3)," but ultimately
concluding that, in practice, the evisceration concern is not manifest). See also J. Douglas
Richards and Benjamin D. Brown, Predominanceof Common Questions-Common Mistakes
in Applying the Class Action Standard, 41 Rutgers L J 163, 184 n 87 (2009), quoting
Castano, 84 F3d at 745 n 21 (noting that this use of Rule 23(c)(4) assures "automatic certification in every case in which there is a common issue," a near certainty in any wellfashioned class action complaint).
134 See Castano, 84 F3d at 745 (noting that this liberal use of Rule 23(c)(4) "would
write the predominance requirement out of the rule").
135 Compare id at 745 n 21 (explaining that "[a] district court cannot manufacture
predominance through the nimble use of subdivision (c)(4)," as "[t]he proper interpretation of the interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of action, as a
whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement ... and that (c)(4) is a housekeeping
rule"), with In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F3d 219, 225 (2d Cir 2006)
(holding that a district court may, sua sponte, "employ Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to certify a class
on a particular issue even if the action as a whole does not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement").
136 See McLaughlin, 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 4:43 at 1053 (cited in note 12).
137 For an explanation of this "expansivist" approach to the Rule 23(c)(4) circuit
split, see Wylie, Comment, 76 U Cin L Rev at 358-63 (cited in note 133).
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4. The "distinguish" bin-clarifying what Comcast is not.
Finally, a number of courts have sought to avoid Comcast
altogether by explaining what it is not and why, by negative
inference, it does not apply to particular cases. The Second,138
Seventh, 139 and Ninth Circuits,140 in addition to a litany of district courts,' 4 ' have embraced a version of this approach. Note

that no two courts in this (functionally) catchall bin treat Comcast
in an identical manner. Insofar as there is a common theme in
this varied case law, it is that these courts have sought to avoid
the application of Comcast altogether, typically by drawing on
142
one of the case's many complexities.
For example, in Butler v Sears, Roebuck and Co,143 Judge
Richard Posner explained that Comcast was inapplicable to the
claims at bar-breach of warranty claims aggregated in a class
action filed under Rule 23(b)(3)-because Comcast principally
concerned the proffered class's ability to tie each class member's
damages to a common theory of liability.4 Unlike the four theories of antitrust impact in Comcast, the Butler class presented a
uniform theory of liability tied to a common harm-defective
washing machines. 145 The defining feature of Comcast for the
Butler court was the plaintiffs' complicated impact model, which
138

See In re U.S. Foodservice Inc Pricing Litigation, 729 F3d 108, 123 & n 8 (2d

Cir 2013) (noting that Comcast pertains only to those cases with byzantine damages
measurements).
139 See Butler, 727 F3d at 799-800.
140 See Leyva v Medline Industries, Inc, 716 F3d 510, 514 (9th Cir 2013).
141 See, for example, Vaccarino v Midland National Life Insurance Co, 2014 WL
572365, *12 (CD Cal); Martins v 3PD, Inc, 2013 WL 1320454, *3 n 3 (D Mass) (opting to
"interpret [Comcast] not to foreclose the possibility of class certification where some individual ... determinations will neither be particularly complicated nor overwhelmingly
numerous"); Parrav Bashas, Inc, 291 FRD 360, 393 (D Ariz 2013), quoting Comcast, 133
S Ct at 1433 ("In the present case, unlike Comcast, plaintiffs' methodology ... for calculating back pay demonstrates that such damages are 'capable of measurement on a
classwide basis."') (citation omitted); Neale v Volvo Cars of North America, LLC, 2013
WL 5674355, *2 (D NJ) ("In Comcast, the damages theory was based on a model designed by an expert. ... Here, the damages issue is much more straightforward-all
class members who purchased Defendants' product were allegedly damaged by a design
defect."); Altamura v L'Orgal, USA, Inc, 2013 WL 4537175, *2 (CD Cal) (noting that the
uncertainties created by Comcast merit granting a motion to stay).
142 See, for example, In re Heckmann Corp Securities Litigation, 2013 WL 2456104,
*14 (D Del) (concluding that Comcast is inapplicable in the securities-fraud context).
143 727 F3d 796 (7th Cir 2013).
144 Id at 800 (distinguishing the case by noting that, "[u]nlike the situation in Comcast,
there is no possibility in this case that damages could be attributed to acts of the defendants
that are not challenged on a class-wide basis").
145 Id at 798-99.
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muddied the damages question.146 By contrast, determining the
equivalent of an impact theory in a products-liability claim is
remarkably uncomplicated. 147 For the Butler court, Comcast was
simply inapposite to such cases regardless of how one interprets
the Court's holding.148 It was clear to the Butler court that Comcast
does not prohibit 23(b)(3) class certification in all instances in
149
which individualized damages are present.
The Ninth Circuit in Leyva v Medline Industries Incso found
Comcast similarly inapposite. The court, in reviewing certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class seeking lost wages, determined that
Comcast had little to say about those cases in which the proffered class presents a common means of demonstrating that the
class members' damages flowed from a defendant's actions."'
Unlike courts in the mitigation bin, which largely recognize the
pertinence of Comcast but rely on the dissent to mitigate its
importance, the Leyva court simply determined that Comcast
did not apply to the case at bar. 1 2 Other courts, in a related vein,
have suggested that Comcast does not speak to cases involving
154
small class sizes"s or comparatively simple issues.
This final interpretive bin is unique insofar as the courts
within it avoid reading Comcast as applying to all categories of
class actions (and either ardently apply it, as in the first bin, or
mitigate it, as in the second bin). However, courts in this bin do
not set forth a positive theory of what Comcast ought to stand for
going forward. This is particularly important given the wellnoted ambiguity inherent in Comcast.15 This bin suffers from a
146 See id at 799 (beginning the Comcast analysis by noting that "Comcast was an
antitrust suit") (emphasis added).
147 See Butler, 727 F3d at 799, quoting Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1434.
148 See Butler, 727 F3d at 800.
149 See id at 801 (noting that an individualized-damages-centric reading of Comcast
would "drive a stake through the heart of the class action device," while emphasizing
that "the fact that damages are not identical across all class members should not preclude class certification").
150 716 F3d 510 (9th Cir 2013).
151 Id at 514.

152 See id ("Here, unlike in Comcast, if putative class members prove Medline's liability, damages will be calculated based on the wages each employee lost due to Medline's unlawful practices.") (emphasis added).
153 See, for example, Martins, 2013 WL 1320454 at *3 n 3 (allowing class certification
because the claims involved were neither "particularly complicated nor overwhelmingly
numerous").
154 See, for example, Neale, 2013 WL 5674355 at *2 (distinguishing Comcast because
the damages issue in the case at bar was "much more straightforward").
155 See Part II.A. See also In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, 289 FRD
555, 567 (ND Cal 2013), citing Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1431 (commenting on the importance
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self-inflicted wound: its dependence on negative inference hampers its portability.
It is difficult to distill any bright-line rule from courts in
this bin. While one could draw on these courts' opinions by negative inference, this would yield a disaggregated collection of unhelpful conclusions. For example, one court within this bin has
suggested that Comcast does not apply when the proffered class
is sufficiently small.56 Drawing on the obvious uncertainty over
what is or is not sufficiently small, one should ask whether
Comcast would have been decided differently had the class presented an identical case, but with two thousand plaintiffs rather
than two million. Does Comcast really turn on the size of the
class in that case? The substance of the Court's opinion suggests
that the answer is no. 157 The Court paid scant attention to, and
indeed seemed unfazed by, the size of the class. Basing one's interpretation of Comcast on a distinction that the Comcast opinion
itself sheds no light on should occasion considerable pause.
Likewise, the Butler court's suggestion that Comcast is inapplicable when a class is able to tie its members' damages to a
single theory of injury may encounter considerable difficulties
when the circumstances are slightly modified. 158 If, for example,
the proffered class in Comcast had presented only a single theory
of antitrust injury-such as overbuilder deterrence-it remains
doubtful that the Court would have granted certification. The
defendant would have been able to argue that its clustering (the
antitrust violation) affected the class members in unique ways.
Indeed, it might have contended that its clustering injured certain members of the class by means other than overbuilder deterrence, positing additional theories of antitrust injury as defenses
capable of fracturing the predominance of questions common to
the class. This would raise the very questions that concerned the
Comcast majority. 159 This line of inquiry highlights the necessity
of advancing a positive interpretation of Comcast.

of culling an affirmative "requirement" out of Comcast "to ensure that the predominance
requirement is met").
156 See Martins, 2013 WL 1320454 at *3 n 3.
157 See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1432-33.
158 See Butler, 727 F3d at 800.
159 See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1434 (noting that "Glouchester County may have been
overcharged because of petitioners' alleged elimination of satellite competition... while
subscribers in Camden County may have paid elevated prices because of petitioners' increased bargaining power") (emphasis added).
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III. THE PREDOMINANCE OF ANTITRUST INJURY: A POSITIVE
INTERPRETATION OF COMCAST

As the preceding critiques emphasize, no extant interpretation of Comcast is particularly attractive. Thus, a new conceptualization is needed. This Comment contends that Comcast can
and should be understood as a case turning on a unique feature
of class actions in the antitrust context-antitrust injury. Specifically, the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry should principally
turn on the antitrust-injury element of the proffered class's
claim. This solution, derived from Comcast, necessarily raises
the threshold for class certification in the antitrust context. It is
far more demanding to require proffered antitrust classes seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3) to demonstrate that common questions of antitrust injury-rather than merely of antitrust violations-predominate. However, this heightened
threshold applies solely to antitrust class actions. This interpretation gives Comcast meaning in the antitrust context but cabins
its scope, such that the general predominance-inquiry rule is not
displaced in other contexts.
In advancing this contention, which displaces the accepted
hegemony of antitrust-violation questions in the predominance
inquiry,160 this Part will begin by returning to a general discussion
of Rule 23(b)(3), explaining how it was applied in the antitrust
context prior to Comcast. Next, it will turn toward antitrust injury
and the concept's inherent plasticity. Drawing on this analysis, it
will then revisit Comcast to demonstrate that, descriptively, the
case is best read as one concerning antitrust injury rather than
individualized damages. This Part concludes by arguing that
Comcast should, normatively, be interpreted as a case concerning
antitrust injury.

A.

Rule 23(b)(3) in Antitrust Class Actions

Antitrust actions are frequently brought as Rule 23(b)(3)
damages classes.161 This frequency is attributable to two factors:
First, allegedly anticompetitive behavior often does a small
amount of harm (as measured by individual damages) to an

160 See notes 27-30 and accompanying text. See also Britt Green Trucking, Inc v
FedExNational,LTL, Inc, 2013 WL 6051752, *11 (MD Fla), citing Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433.
161 See Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA FederalPractice and Procedure § 1781 at 227
& n 2 (cited in note 8).

1240

The University of Chicago Law Review

enormous number of consumers.

62 Second,

[81:1213

classes of consumers

can claim with relative ease that they are all victims of a common antitrust violation, given that antitrust violations typically
harm an entire market.163 To sustain a private antitrust action,
three elements must be established: (1) a violation of antitrust
law; (2) damages; and (3) injury to the plaintiff as a result of the
alleged violation, otherwise known as "antitrust injury."164 When
an antitrust claim is brought as a class action, these three elements are the focus of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry.
Prior to Comcast, the general rule that individualized damages
did not necessarily defeat Rule 23(b)(3) predominance applied to
antitrust class actions. The majority of Rule 23(b)(3) antitrust
class actions were able to satisfy the predominance inquiry
when the question of a defendant's liability was common to the
entire class.165 Against this backdrop, the general rule that individualized damages are merely a factor in the predominance inquiry was maintained in the antitrust context. 66

162 See Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official's Reflections on Antitrust Class
Actions, 39 Ariz L Rev 413, 438 (1997) (noting the 'large numbers of small claimants in
some antitrust classes").
163 See Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1781 at
233-35 (cited in note 8).
164 See In re PublicationPaperAntitrust Litigation, 690 F3d 51, 61-62, 66 (2d Cir
2012); Windham v American Brands, Inc, 565 F2d 59, 65 & n 11 (4th Cir 1977), citing
Zenith Radio Corp v Hazeltine Research, Inc, 395 US 100 (1969). For an application of
these elements, see In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litigation, 283 FRD 222, 234-47 (ED
Pa 2012) (reviewing each of these three "essential elements of [an] antitrust claim" to
determine whether common questions predominate).
165 See, for example, In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, 264 FRD
100, 114 (SDNY 2010). See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay
Kane, 7AA Federal Practiceand Procedure§ 1781 at 105 (West 2014 Supp) (noting that
Comcast undercuts the traditional rule).
166 See, for example, In re New Motor Vehicles CanadianExport Antitrust Litigation,
522 F3d 6, 28 (1st Cir 2008) ("Predominance is not defeated by individual damages questions so long as liability is still subject to common proof."); Klay v Humana, Inc, 382 F3d
1241, 1260 (11th Cir 2004) ("It is primarily when there are significant individualized
questions going to liability that the need for individualized assessments of damages is
enough to preclude 23(b)(3) certification."); Smilow v Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems,
Inc, 323 F3d 32, 40 (1st Cir 2003) ("Where, as here, common questions predominate
regarding liability, then courts generally find the predominance requirement to be satisfied even if individual damages issues remain."); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F3d 124, 139 (2d Cir 2001) ("Common issues may predominate when
liability can be determined on a class-wide basis, even when there are some individualized damage issues."); Bogosian v Gulf Oil Corp, 561 F2d 434, 456 (3d Cir 1977) ("[I]t has
been commonly recognized that the necessity for calculation of damages on an individual
basis should not preclude class determination when the common issues which determine
liability predominate.").
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It is worth noting, however, that the third element of an antitrust claim-antitrust injury67-often translates into a requirement that the class present an antitrust impact model.168 An
impact model is an evidentiary means of demonstrating that the
alleged antitrust violation was the reason for the plaintiffs' injury.
That is, impact models demonstrate that a plaintiffs damages
were the result of an injury "intended to be prevented by the
statute or rule the plaintiff has invoked to establish liability."169
For example, an antitrust class alleging illicit cartelization may
present a model showing that the actual price of the product in
question is inflated over what the price would be in a hypothetical world of perfect competition.170 In the class action context,
impact models further serve to establish the possibility of a
common assessment of the harm that a defendant's alleged antitrust violation caused to class members.
Several courts have determined that the failure to present
an impact model demonstrating a common antitrust injury
across the class is fatal to the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry.171 Nonetheless, this typically did not conflict with the preComcast general role of individualized damages. Even in the
context of antitrust class actions, it has been "uniformly" held
that individualized-damages questions do not predominate.172 In
other words, as long as common antitrust injury is present, individualized damages are not dispositive of certification.
B.

Antitrust Injury: Liability, Damages, Standing, or All of the
Above?

Theoretically, antitrust injury is a critical element of an antitrust cause of action. 73 However, it has proven a remarkably
167

See Part III.B.

168 See, for example, Alabama v Blue Bird Body Co, 573 F2d 309, 320 (5th Cir 1978).
169 Ronald W. Davis, Standing on Shaky Ground: The Strangely Elusive Doctrine of
Antitrust Injury, 70 Antitrust L J 697, 744 (2003).
170 See In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM)Antitrust Litigation, 256
FRD 82, 85 (D Conn 2009).
171 See, for example, In re New Motor Vehicles CanadianExport, 522 F3d at 20 ("In
antitrust class actions, common issues do not predominate if the fact of antitrust violation and the fact of antitrust impact cannot be established through common proof.');
Blades v Monsanto Co, 400 F3d 562, 569 (8th Cir 2005); Bell Atlantic Corp v AT&T Corp,
339 F3d 294, 303-04 (5th Cir 2003).
172 Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA FederalPractice & Procedure§ 1781 at 235 (cited
in note 8).
173 See text accompanying note 164. See also Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp,
1 Fundamentalsof Antitrust Law § 3.03 at 24-25 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed 2013).
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ambiguous concept in practice. Antitrust injury traces its origins
to Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc,174 in which the
Supreme Court required the plaintiff to demonstrate "antitrust
injury" in addition to establishing liability and damages. 175 The
defendant, a bowling-alley operator, acquired three decrepit
bowling alleys in markets where the plaintiffs, also bowlingalley operators, competed.176 The plaintiffs objected to the acquisitions as an instance of monopolization, which is a violation of
antitrust laws prohibiting mergers that tend to dangerously in177
crease the acquiring firm's market share.
The Brunswick Court assumed arguendo that the defendant
had violated antitrust laws. 178 Nonetheless, the Court dismissed
the claims. The Court first noted that every successful merger is
likely to have some negative impact on some competitor. 179 Such
is the nature of competition. However, antitrust laws, for the
Court, were designed to prevent only those negative impacts
that flow from anticompetitive behavior.80 That is, antitrust
laws are concerned with preventing market entry only when it
would harm competition. Here, not only were the plaintiffs' injuries not encapsulated within this competition-centric framework,
but the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs were the result of
procompetitive behavior.181 Indeed, the plaintiffs' injuries were
simply caused by a successful bowling alley breathing new competitive life into three decrepit competitors that otherwise would
have gone out of business, thereby decreasing the plaintiffs'
market position. Were the Court to punish this behavior, antitrust law would be a vehicle for suppressing procompetitive
activity, which axiomatically and definitionally harms competitors.
The Brunswick Court captured this idea--of showing not only
that an antitrust violation led to an injury, but also showing
174 429 US 477 (1977).
175 Id at 489 (emphasis omitted).
176 Id at 480.
177 Id (noting that the plaintiffs asserted that "these acquisitions might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act").
178 See Brunswick, 429 US at 477 (observing that the plaintiffs' claims "are well illustrated by the facts of this case").
179 Id at 487 ("Every merger of two existing entities into one, whether lawful or unlawful, has the potential for producing economic readjustments that adversely affect
some persons.").
180 Id (stating that "Congress has not condemned mergers" because they harm competitors, but rather it "has condemned them only when they may produce anticompetitive effects").
181 See id at 488 (stating that it would be "imimical to the purposes of [antitrust]
laws to award damages for the type of injury claimed here').
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why that injury occurred-in the concept of "antitrust injury."182
The Court defined antitrust injury as the "type [of injury that]
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from
that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."183 This, in practice, requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that her injury was
the result not merely of an antitrust violation, but more specifically of an antitrust violation that resulted in explicitly anticompetitive effects. Not included in antitrust injury are antitrust
violations that cause "an economic effect as to which antitrust
law is indifferent, or, even worse, an economic effect that anti'1 4
trust promotes, such as aggressive non-predatory competition."'
For example, in Brunswick the plaintiffs' injuries were caused
by procompetitive behavior. Even though this procompetitive
behavior may itself have constituted a violation of antitrust
law-as a dangerous merger-the injury was not of the type
that antitrust law was designed or intended to prevent.
To illustrate, consider antitrust law as it applies to mergers.
Large mergers-those between two or more competitors with a
significant market share in a given industry-are frequently
found to violate antitrust law's prohibition on monopolization.185
However, as the Brunswick Court made clear, establishing such
a violation is not enough to sustain an antitrust cause of action.
The injuries that a merger-even one that is an admitted violation of antitrust law-exacts on competitors by lowering prices,
providing superior products, or simply outcompeting rivals are
not recoverable in antitrust law.186 Antitrust injury does not
merely ask whether there was an antitrust violation, but also
why there was an antitrust violation.187
182 Brunswick, 429 US at 489 (emphasis omitted) (holding that plaintiffs "must
prove antitrustinjury" to sustain an antitrust claim).
183 Id. See also Phillip E. Areeda, et al, IIA Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles and Their Application I 335f at 74 (Wolters Kluwer 3d ed 2007) (clarifying
that antitrust injury "demands that the plaintiffs alleged injury result from the threat to
competition that underlies the alleged violation").
184 Davis, 70 Antitrust L J at 698 (cited in note 169).
185 See Louis Altman and Malla Pollack, 1 Callmann on Unfair Competition,
Trademarksand Monopolies § 4:42 at 443 (West 4th ed 2003).
186 See Davis, 70 Antitrust L J at 718 (cited in note 169), quoting Cargill,Inc v Monfort
of Colorado, Inc, 479 US 104, 116-17 (1986) ("The logic of Brunswick compels the conclusion
that the threat of loss of profits due to possible price competition following a merger does
not constitute a threat of antitrust injury.").
187 Davis, 70 Antitrust L J at 723 (cited in note 169):

Very simply, the doctrine of antitrust injury requires a court to examine not
only whether the acts the defendant allegedly committed violate the law but also
why they violate the law. The doctrine, in other words, directs a court to examine,
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Given this tenuous operationalization, defining the precise
nature of antitrust injury is a complicated task. Critically, antitrust injury draws on multiple independent elements of an
antitrust cause of action; antitrust injury requires a bad act (violation) precipitating (causation) an anticompetitive result (liability) that injured a plaintiff (damages). As such, the antitrustinjury element has been varyingly labeled as a question of
damages, 8 8 liability,189 and causation.190 In fact, antitrust injury
contains shades of each textured element of a cause of action.
The complications that this inquiry can create illustrate the vital
importance of antitrust impact models-they are the means by
which plaintiffs attempt to demonstrate the why, in addition to
the whether, of an antitrust claim. 191
Antitrust injury as a concept is perhaps best understood by
contrasting the inner workings of a hypothetical tort action with
those of Comcast, an antitrust action. Critically, a tort plaintiff
will recover for any injury caused by a defendant's negligence,
even if that injury was not the sort that the rule was meant to
guard against.192 Again consider an action alleging that the
defendant negligently released a toxin into the surrounding environment. 193 The plaintiff will be compensated for any injury
sufficiently established. 194 For example, even if the release of

in a proper case, what economic effects the case law rule or statute in question
seeks to prevent.
188 See id at 724 (noting that the "unwary" have simply taken antitrust injury to refer
to "injury in fact').
189 See In re New Motor Vehicles CanadianExport, 522 F3d at 28 ("Establishing liability, however, still requires showing that class members were injured at the consumer
level."). See also McLaughlin, 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 5:36 at 1416 (cited in
note 12) ("The fact of individual injury, in other words, is a liability issue, not simply a
damages issue.").
190 See Rogers, et al, Antitrust Law at 840 (cited in note 183), quoting Daniel Berger
and Roger Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 Yale L J 809,
811 (1977) (stating that antitrust injury is 'like the proximate cause requirement in the
law of torts").
191See Davis, 70 Antitrust L J at 703 (cited in note 169) ('To learn whether there is
antitrust injury, we must first fill in the blank in the sentence, 'The merger [or the
agreement in restraint of trade, or the unilateral business practice, or whatever] was
illegal because ...
"'") (brackets in original).
192 See Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, and Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 206
(West 2d ed 2011) ("The foreseeability or risk rule holds the defendant subject to liability
if he could reasonably foresee the nature of the harm done, even if the total amount of
harm turned out to be quite unforeseeably large.").
193 See notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
194 See J.D. Lee and Barry A. Lindahl, 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation
§ 6.01 at 171 (Callaghan rev ed 1988).
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toxins is thought to be tortious only because it creates a negligent risk of destroying area flora, an individual who happens to
come into contact with the toxin and who has an extremely rare
allergic reaction will also be compensated. 19, Tort law does not
ask what the background negligence rule was meant to guard
against, only whether the defendant in fact caused an injury.
Antitrust law is different. Consider, for example, a modification of Comcast in which the firms that were deterred from entering the market due to Comcast's dominance-overbuilder
firms-themselves sought redress for Comcast's behavior.196
These hypothetical plaintiffs would be able to establish that
Comcast had violated the antitrust law through its clustering
activities and thereby inflicted an injury on potential new entrants who were deterred from the market. However, a more
piercing analysis of the claim would reveal that the overbuilders
were injured as a result of facing a more robust competitor. That
is, Comcast's clustering had effectively raised the cost of entry
by allowing the firm to cut its own costs through consolidating
its equipment, thereby freeing resources to more effectively
compete with new entrants.1 97 While this modification of Comcast
is only loosely based on the district court's findings of factinjuries sustained by competitor firms were not at issue in the
case, precisely because those firms could not satisfy the antitrust-injury requirement-the example illustrates the Brunswick
concept. The injury sustained by these firms is not the "type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful."198 Rather, the "injury"
sustained by the deterred potential entrants is precisely the type
that antitrust law attempts to encourage-greater competition.99
Within this framework, antitrust injury has expanded to a
threshold question of justiciability-one that is evaluated before
ever reaching the merits of a claim. In short, antitrust injury is
195

See Jacob A. Stein, 2 Stein on Personal Injury Damages § 11:1 at 11-7 (West 3d

ed 1997) ("When the plaintiff suffers from a latent condition that is brought to light by
the injury, the defendant may be held responsible for all of the damages resulting from
the defendant's triggering of the condition.").
196 See Part ILA.1.
197 See Behrend v Comcast Corp, 264 FRD 150, 167 (ED Pa 2010) ("Clustering also
deters overbuilding by enhancing the clustering incumbent's ability to increase the cost
and reduce the benefits of overbuilding.").
198 Brunswick, 429 US at 489.
199 See generally Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself
(Free Press 1993) (arguing that aspects of antitrust law overprotect inefficient small
businesses at the expense of greater competition, thereby harming consumers).
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pertinent to and a component of standing. This was explicitly
acknowledged by the Brunswick Court.200 This construction of
antitrust injury as a question of standing has since gained nearuniversal acceptance. 201 That said, the Court has made clear that
"antitrust standing," derived through "antitrust injury," is distinct from the typical Article III standing requirement.202 Antitrust standing involves identifying the best, rather than a possible, plaintiff to bring the antitrust claim.2o3 That is, it ensures
that claims brought before a court are grounded in injuries that
were the result of anticompetitive rather than procompetitive
behavior. While antitrust law is clearly concerned with market
injuries, it explicitly endorses competition, knowing that competitive forces will enact some injury on some party (namely, a
competitor).
The parallels between this a priori question of standing and
the predominance inquiry that Rule 23(b)(3) imposes are striking. While both plainly relate to the merits of a plaintiffs claim
and require the court to tangentially evaluate the merits of that
claim,204 they each operate as threshold questions designed to
screen out improper plaintiffs.

200 See Brunswick, 429 US at 489 (discussing the plaintiffs burden of proof required
to demonstrate an antitrust injury).
201 See Bell v Dow Chemical Co, 847 F2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir 1988) ("Antitrust injury

is a component of the standing inquiry, not a separate qualification."). See also 54 Am
Jur 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices§ 381 at 427 (cited in
note 122) (noting that "[a]ntitrust injury and antitrust standing are overlapping concepts"); Edward K. Esping, John R. Kennel, and Thomas Muskus, Monopolies, 58 Corpus
Juris Secundum § 227 at 849-50 (West 2009).
202 See Associated General Contractorsof California,Inc v CaliforniaState Council
of Carpenters,459 US 519, 535 & n 31 (1983):
[T]he focus of the doctrine of "antitrust standing" is somewhat different from
that of standing as a constitutional doctrine. Harm to the antitrust plaintiff is
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact,
but the court must make a further determination whether the plaintiff is a
proper party to bring a private antitrust action.
203 See Thomas V. Vakerics, Antitrust Basics § 3.03[2] at 3-24 (Law Journal 2013)
('"The concept of antitrust injury is designed to screen out complaints by competitors and
others who were not hurt by anticompetitive practices. Instead, they were impacted by
productive efficiencies, higher output and lower prices, factors the antitrust laws are intended to encourage.").
204 Compare Davis, 70 Antitrust L J at 704-05 (cited in note 169) (noting that to establish "standing" through antitrust injury, the antitrust plaintiff must establish a plausible merits-based nexus between the alleged violation and her injury), with Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc v Dukes, 131 S Ct 2541, 2551 (2011) (stating that the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry will frequently "entail overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs underlying
claim").
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Reading Antitrust Injury into Comcast

This Section's first contention is that Comcast is, descriptively, best read as a case prioritizing antitrust injury over individualized damages. It is worth emphasizing that this is an interpretation of Comcast, not an attempt to discern the Court's genuine meaning (if there can be one) in the case. As this Comment's review of lower court interpretations of Comcast makes
clear, this has become a common exercise. This Comment attempts
to succeed where others have failed, advancing an interpretation
that meets the following criteria: first, giving due meaning to
the Comcast majority; second, making sense of the Comcast dissent's argument that the majority opinion does not alter the
general predominance-inquiry rule; and third, formulating a
normatively desirable reading. This Section illustrates that the
antitrust-injury-centric interpretation of Comcast, independent
of any normative gains to be discussed later, is desirable because it gives meaning to the Comcast majority's opinion without upsetting the general rule governing individualized damages,
thereby also making sense of the dissent's argument.
In giving meaning to the Comcast majority, any interpretation must resonate with the Court's incantations of regularity in
that case. 2 5 Although the Comcast majority focused on whether
there was a means of calculating damages common to the
class,206 that is not, in fact, a question of individualized damages
in the antitrust context, but rather a question of antitrust injury.207
The Comcast Court was likely not discussing individualized damages in the ordinary sense, but rather antitrust injury. To wit,
the opinion clearly and directly highlights antitrust injury.20s It
is worth noting that at least one court in the distinguish bin has

205 Specifically, the Court stated that the case "turns on the straightforward application of class-certification principles." Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433.
206 See id at 1434 (stating that "assurance is not provided by a methodology that
identifies damages that are not the result of the wrong").
207 See In re Currency Conversion Fee, 264 FRD at 115 (concluding that, "because
the parties essentially agree on a common methodology for proving injury-in-fact on a
class-wide basis, common questions also predominate on the injury-in-fact prong of antitrust injury"). See also Areeda and Hovenkamp, 1 Fundamentalsof Antitrust Law § 3:03
at 35 (cited in note 173) (noting that "the antitrust injury doctrine depends less on the
plaintiffs proof than on ... its theory of injury," and that "[t]heories that do not depend
on proof are well suited to pre-discovery disposition").
208 See Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433 ("There is no question that the model failed to
measure damages resulting from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners'
liability in this action is premised.").
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recognized as much.209 In clarifying that Comcast simply could
not weigh on all class actions, the Butler court carefully noted
that the Supreme Court's opinion should not be read as a commentary on individualized damages writ large.21o This Comment
takes that clarification one step further-the Comcast opinion
was affirmatively erecting antitrust injury as the centerpiece of
the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry in the antitrust context.
This interpretation of Comcast explains the core puzzle driving the lower court chaos-why the opinion was couched in
terms of ordinary Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence.211 A damagescentric interpretation of Comcast would be far from ordinaryrather, it would upset the prevailing Rule 23(b)(3) interpretation, which provides that the predominance inquiry is satisfied
in the face of individualized damages.212 By contrast, an antitrustinjury-centric approach does not require the displacement of the
preexisting general rule, but still gives weight to the Comcast
majority's opinion.
As noted earlier, the general rule on the role of liability as
opposed to individualized damages held true in the antitrustclass-action context prior to Comcast.213 Even commonality as to
the antitrust-violation element of the claim regularly satisfied Rule
23(b)(3) predominance in the face of individualized damages.214
That said, an existing body of case law predating Comcast holds
that, in antitrust class actions, antitrust injury is more than
simply a factor in the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry.215

210

See Butler, 727 F3d at 801.
See id.

211

See note 61 and accompanying text.

212

See Part I.B.

209

See notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Eisen v Carlisle and Jacquelin, 391 F2d 555, 565-66 (2d Cir
1968) (determining that, while damage computations may vary among class members,
the alleged unlawful conspiracy sufficed as a common element); In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney, 280 F3d at 139.
215 See, for example, In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 579 F3d 241,
268 (3d Cir 2009), quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F3d 305,
311-12 (3d Cir 2008) ("Accordingly, for purposes of class certification pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3), the task for plaintiffs ... is to demonstrate that the element of antitrust impact
is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.") (quotation marks omitted); In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F3d at
311 ("In antitrust cases, impact often is critically important for the purpose of evaluating
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement because it is an element of the claim that may
call for individual, as opposed to common, proof.'); In re New Motor Vehicles CanadianExport,
522 F3d at 20 ("In antitrust class actions, common issues do not predominate if the fact
of antitrust violation and the fact of antitrust impact cannot be established through
213
214
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Specifically, a number of lower courts have held that predominance was satisfied in the antitrust-class-action context only
when the antitrust-injury element of the claim was common
across the entire class.216 This Comment's reading of Comcast
elevates the importance of this body of case law. That is, prior to
Comcast, an antitrust class action may have been certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) when the plaintiffs were able to show that common
questions regarding a defendant's alleged antitrust violation
predominated. After Comcast, according to this Comment's reading
of that case, an antitrust class action may be certified only when
the class demonstrates that common questions as to its antitrust
injury predominate across the entire class.
This antitrust-injury-centric interpretation also makes
sense of the Comcast dissent's argument that the majority opinion in that case did not upset the general predominance-inquiry
rule. Antitrust injury is unique to antitrust class actions. The
dissent's view-that the Comcast majority should not be read to
say that, when individualized damages are present, Rule
23(b)(3) certification must axiomatically fail217-is also embraced
by this Comment's interpretation of the case. Note, for example,
that the dissent went to considerable lengths to highlight the
unique importance of antitrust law to the case. 218 The naturally
ensuing question is: Why dissent at all if both opinions agreed
that antitrust injury should predominate? The answer lies in the
dissent's view of the merits of the plaintiffs' antitrust-injury claim.
Namely, the dissent believed that the majority's rebuke of the
plaintiffs' antitrust-injury claim was an impermissible upheaval of
the district court's findings of fact, which it argued should dic219
tate the matter.
Having established a plausible descriptive reading of Corncast-one that both gives due weight to the majority opinion and
makes sense of the dissent's argument that the majority's opinion cannot be read to upset the general predominance-inquiry
common proof.'); Bell Atlantic, 339 F3d at 307. See also Areeda and Hovenkamp, 1 Fundamentals of Antitrust Law § 3:03 at 28 (cited in note 173).
216 See text accompanying note 171.
217 Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1437 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting) ("In the mine run of
cases, it remains the 'black letter rule' that a class may obtain certification under Rule
23(b)(3) when liability questions common to the class predominate over damages questions unique to class members.").
218 See id at 1439 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting) ('The special antitrust-related
difficulty present here stems from the manner in which respondents attempted to prove
their antitrust injuries.").
219 See id (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
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rule-it is worth turning to the normative implications of this
reading.
D.

Establishing the Predominance of Antitrust Injury

Comcast ought to be read as a case ushering in a new approach to the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry exclusively in
the antitrust context. Critically, the fusion of Rule 23(b)(3) and
antitrust injury will yield a symbiotic relationship between the
two. Each can ultimately buttress the other's goals.
First, prioritizing antitrust injury will best serve the goals
of Rule 23(b)(3). As noted earlier, Rule 23(b)(3) aims to achieve
judicial economies.220 The reason that liability questions are ordinarily prioritized in the predominance inquiry is that they are
generally thought to be more complex and resource-consuming
than individualized-damages questions.221 This focus on judicial
economies is particularly important in the antitrust context,
given the inherently complex nature of antitrust-injury theories,
which are often scaled over many thousands of plaintiffs.222
The potential judicial-economies concern this raises is magnified in light of the means by which antitrust injury is typically
asserted and rebutted-dueling econometric models.223 The failure to determine ex ante that antitrust injury predominates will
result in thousands of incredibly complex and expensive minitrials
over these already complex and expensive models. By contrast,
resolving the antitrust-injury question at the outset will often
dispense with liability and damages questions as well, which
both naturally flow from antitrust injury.224 That is, having established that the proffered class sustained an anticompetitive injury
flowing from a violation of antitrust law, a plaintiff will have
definitionally established the liability and damages elements of
its claim.
This view of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry, which
is centered on judicial economies, helps to clarify why antitrust
injury should be the centerpiece of antitrust class actions,
whereas liability should be the centerpiece of other types of class
220
221
222
223
224

See
See
See
See
See

note 13 and accompanying text.
notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
Rogers, et al, Antitrust Law at 882 (cited in note 183).
note 42 and accompanying text.
Esping and Kennel, Monopolies, 58 Corpus Juris Secundum § 227 at 850

(cited in note 201) (noting that, in establishing antitrust injury, the private plaintiff
must demonstrate an "antitrust violation and that the violation was at least a material
cause of the plaintiffs injury").
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actions. Consider, as an example, a class action comprised of
workers seeking wages withheld in violation of various labor
laws.225 Reduced to its core elements, the predominance inquiry
could possibly turn on one of two issues-liability or damages.
Each plaintiff would, in an individual trial, advance strikingly
similar (if not identical) evidence to demonstrate that the employer withheld wages. By contrast, it would be surprising if any
two employees were due an identical withheld wage. Nonetheless, most courts (at least prior to Comcast226) would certify the
class, recognizing the ease with which individual damages could
be calculated-simply multiply the number of hours worked by
the applicable hourly wage.
In the antitrust context, individualized antitrust injury
cannot be so simply determined. While individualized damages
and common questions as to liability could be addressed with
similar ease in both a wage and an antitrust class action, there
is no analogue for antitrust injury in the wage context. Antitrust
injury is necessarily complex, as is the time- and resourceconsuming process of determining whether the proffered antitrust class has established that it can be commonly addressed
across the class.227 Determining individualized antitrust injury
would require compiling hundreds, if not thousands (depending
on the size of the class), of multivariate impact models to
demonstrate that individual class members had suffered an injury as a result of anticompetitive behavior, as opposed to the
comparatively simple task of assessing whether there has been
228
any injury in the more general sense.
Second, Rule 23(b)(3) can itself buttress the central goal
of antitrust injury-identifying the best antitrust plaintiff.229

225 See, for example, Smith v Family Video Movie Club, Inc, 2013 WL 1628176, *10
(ND Ill).
226 For an example of courts that would not follow this predictable mold, see Part II.B.1.
227 For a discussion of antitrust impact models, see text accompanying note 166.
228 See text accompanying notes 242-44.
229 See, for example, Greater Rockford Energy & Technology Corp v Shell Oil Co, 998
F2d 391, 395 (7th Cir 1993) (noting that antitrust standing "examines the connection
between the asserted wrongdoing and the claimed injury to limit the class of potential
plaintiffs to those who are in the best position to vindicate the antitrust infraction");
Todorov v DCH Healthcare Authority, 921 F2d 1438, 1448 (11th Cir 1991) ("Antitrust
standing is best understood in a general sense as a search for the proper plaintiff to enforce the antitrust laws."). See also David Gregory Mayhan, Note, More Trouble with
Treble: The Effects of McCready and Associated General Contractors on the Antitrust
Standing Opinions of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 10 J Corp L 463, 488 n 220 (1985)
(noting that antitrust standing limits claims to "those plaintiffs in the best position to
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Antitrust injury, as noted earlier, constitutes the backbone of
antitrust standing.230 Antitrust standing, to a greater extent
than constitutional standing, aims to identify the ideal party to
bring suit against the alleged wrongdoer.231 This is uniquely necessary in an antitrust lawsuit, in which there may be thousands
of private parties and a number of independent regulatory actors
with constitutional standing.232 Unlike other class action contexts,
in which nearly any injured plaintiff will do, in the antitrust context a number of plaintiffs will have suffered injury-and therefore will likely meet Article III's standing requirements-but will
not have suffered an antitrustinjury.
As such, antitrust standing-determined by antitrust injuryoperates as a costly screen. In establishing a high threshold of
justiciability by importing antitrust injury into the analysis, antitrust standing requires plaintiffs to establish their antitrust injury up front or abandon the claim. That is, it compels potential
litigants to fully internalize their utility (or lack thereof) to antitrust law by demonstrating not only that they are potential
plaintiffs, but also that they are ideal plaintiffs. Compelling potential litigants to internalize the full spectrum of costs and
benefits, rather than merely considering the benefits of antitrust
law's promised treble damages,233 is the costly screen. Only those
antitrust plaintiffs with a sufficient probability of successfully
attaining treble damages, discounted against the astronomical
costs associated with establishing antitrust injury,234 will bring
suit. The Court recognized this screening function in Atlantic
Richfield Co v USA Petroleum Co, 23 noting that, in the complex
antitrust arena, it is necessary to identify the ideal plaintiff, lest
a plaintiff negatively impacted by net-procompetitive activity
bring suit.236

litigate the antitrust claim" by, for example, ensuring that plaintiffs have sustained antitrust injury and thereby are "in the best evidentiary position to fully pursue the violation").
230 See text accompanying notes 200-03.
231 See note 203 and accompanying text.
232 See John Bourdeau, et al, 23 Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 54:1 at 498
(West 2012).
233 See 15 USC § 15(a).
234 See In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, 634 F3d 187, 198 (2d Cir
2011) (accepting expert testimony that "even a relatively small economic antitrust study
will cost at least several hundred thousand dollars, while a larger study can easily exceed $1 million"). See also text accompanying notes 220-24.
235 495 US 328 (1990).
236 See id at 342 (stating that antitrust injury "ensures that the harm claimed by
the plaintiff corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in
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However, within this framework, the class action mechanism
operates as a subsidy that offsets antitrust standing's costly
screen effect. By substantially magnifying the potential gain, the
class action device may compel suboptimal litigants and their

counsel to bring

suit. 217

This not only raises administrative

costs-by allowing poorly conceived antitrust class actions that
require complex antitrust-injury minitrials into the judicial system-but also risks overdeterring procompetitive activity. That
is, many harmed by net-procompetitive activities, unable to satisfy antitrust injury on their own, may sneak into the courtroom
via the class action mechanism. Plaintiffs harmed by the procompetitive effects of a defendant's antitrust violation, such as
the overbuilder firms in Comcast,23s would be able to join plaintiffs injured by the anticompetitive effects of the same antitrust
violation. In a nonantitrust class action, the class must establish
liability and damages-both simple elements of any claim that
courts are experienced with. By contrast, antitrust class actions
require the proffered class to establish liability, damages, and
antitrust injury. The third requirement can be easy to sneak
under the radar if the court is not exceedingly careful. Standing
requirements alone will be insufficient to screen out this overdeterrence risk given that individual class members are not per
se required to establish individual standing up front.239
Fortunately, the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry can be
deployed as a countervailing "tax" on the class action "subsidy"
(which, recall, sidesteps the antitrust-injury costly screen). By
requiring classes to establish common antitrust injury at the
outset, the overdeterrence risk can be allayed. By contrast, the
first element in an antitrust action-establishing violation of an
antitrust law-serves as a poor costly screen. The thrust of the
proffered class's claim is frequently encapsulated in the antitrustinjury element owing to its noted hybridity.240 That is, antitrust
injury is often inclusive of liability and damages. For example,
the first place, and it prevents losses that stem from competition from supporting suits
by private plaintiffs for [ ] damages").
237 See Terry Calvani and John Siegfried, Economic Analysis and Antitrust Law 388
(Little, Brown 2d ed 1988).
238 See Part II.A.1.
239 See Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1785.1 at
387-90 (cited in note 8). Though a court may review individual class members' standing
after certification, as a practical matter, the certification order frequently marks the end
of a class proceeding given settlement pressures. See Szabo v Bridgeport Machines, Inc,
249 F3d 672, 675 (7th Cir 2001).
240 See Part III.B.
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the Comcast dissent observed that the plaintiffs appropriately
attempted to use their theories of antitrust injury to establish
the antitrust-violation element of their class claim.241 On this
score, it has been stated that when antitrust injury is present,
the antitrust-violation element of the claim is necessarily established as well.242 Indeed, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer noted
that establishing commonality as to an antitrust "violation may
not be arduous,"' 243 a claim that withstands empirical scrutiny.44
By contrast, establishing commonality as to antitrust injury is a
rigorous and complex process that often entails probing many
different elements of the class claim.
It is important to emphasize that this Comment's interpretation of Comcast is just that-an interpretation. It is admittedly
forced to grapple with what is at best unclear, and at worst unsupportive, language in the case's dueling opinions. What is
clear, however, is that an antitrust-injury-centric interpretation
of Comcast provides meaning and texture to the many intricacies of the case. It is superior to the literal bin because it gives
meaning to the Court's confusing language concerning the general principles governing the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry.
It is superior to the mitigation bin because it assigns due
precedential weight to the majority opinion. It is superior to the
bifurcation bin because it synchronizes the Court's opinion with
long-standing case law. It is superior to the distinguish bin because
it advances a positive and portable interpretation of Comcast.
Most importantly, it constitutes a new interpretation synthesized from existing case law; one in which lower courts navigating the post-Comcast chaos on the ground can seek shelter.
Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1438 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
See John J. Miles, 1 Health Care and Antitrust Law: Principlesand Practice§ 9:6
at 9-55 (West 2011).
243 Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1438 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting).
244 Substantially the same evidence is required to show that a defendant engaged in
241

242

alleged price fixing, for example, whether one or one million plaintiffs bring a claim.
Consider that in every antitrust class action that has cited Comcast, the antitrustviolation component of the class claim was either not challenged or found to be sufficiently
common across the class. See, for example, In re Cox Enterprises,Inc Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litigation, 2014 WL 104964, *5 (WD Okla) ('It is [ ] clear that Plaintiff faced the same alleged illegal tie as that faced by other members of the proposed
class."); In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, 2013 WL 5391159, *3 (ND
Cal) (relying on an expert's impact model and testimony to conclude that "the cartel was
successful at increasing prices," while interrogating whether "the cartel's price increases
impacted all, or nearly all, direct purchasers in a common way"). Interested readers are
encouraged to contact the author for an explanation of the selection and cataloguing of
all relevant cases that have cited Comcast.
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To be sure, one may problematize this interpretation of
Comcast with several potent critiques. First, even if this Comment
provides an optimal reading of Comcast, this reading may not
reflect the Court's actual intent. While the literal bin's interpretation of Comcast may prove harsh in practice, it is not beyond
the realm of possibility that the Court intended this result.245
However, one should regard this possibility with considerable
skepticism given language in the Comcast opinion suggesting
that the majority saw itself as applying ordinary class action
principles.246 Moreover, even if some members of the Court desired Comcast to "drive a stake through the... class action device,"
that is far from what the Court's opinion does.247 This has been
widely observed by courts interpreting Comcast, which explains,
in part, why the literal bin occupies a minority position. Finally,
and assuming arguendo that an expansive reading of Comcast is
descriptively accurate (which rests on murky language at best),
lower courts frequently temper potentially explosive Supreme
Court opinions by reading them on the narrowest possible
grounds. 48 There is nothing stopping the most expansive reading of Comcast from receiving the same treatment.
More troublingly for the antitrust-injury-centric interpretation
is the Court's statement that Comcast did not invite "discussion...
of substantive antitrust law."249 There are, however, several reasons to read this contextually opaque statement as permitting
an antitrust-injury-centric interpretation of Comcast. First, the
Court's admonition of discussing "substantive antitrust law" was
directly targeted at the dissent's attempt to revive the district
court's substantive findings of fact pertaining to the alleged

245 See generally Allan Dinkoff, Tomcast v. Behrend" Bigger Than We Thought at
First Blush?, NY L J (Apr 25, 2013), online at http:llwww.weil.com/-/media/fileslpdfs/
Newsletter_- Employer_-UpdateMay_2013.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
246 See text accompanying note 61.
247 Butler, 727 F3d at 801.
248 For an example in the antitrust context, compare Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly,
550 US 544, 556 (2007) (holding that "an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion
of conspiracy will not suffice" to state a Sherman Act claim), with In re Text Messaging
Antitrust Litigation,630 F3d 622, 628 (7th Cir 2010) (interpreting Twombly narrowly by
finding its requirement satisfied when the plaintiff class alleged parallel conduct and
conspiracy, coupled with evidence that the defendants had the mere opportunity to collude in violation of the Sherman Act). See also Swanson v Citibank, NA, 614 F3d 400,
405 (7th Cir 2010) (rebuking Twombly by holding that the plaintiff had satisfied the
FRCP 8(a)(2) pleading standard when she merely alleged "the type of discrimination that
she thinks occurr[ed]," "by whom" it was done, and "when" it occurred) (emphasis added).
249 Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433.
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antitrust violation.250 Specifically, the Court's apprehension of
"substantive antitrust law" refers to the dissent's extensive discussion of whether the plaintiffs' particular impact model in fact
singled out the "overbuilder deterrence" theory of antitrust injury.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, may have been simply
reminding Justices Ginsburg and Breyer that the Court is entitled to probe behind the merits of the claim, but only up to a
point.51 The Court, in line with ordinary Rule 23 jurisprudence,
emphatically does not allow its suspicions on whether the merits
of the claim will prevail to impact the predominance inquiry unless there is unavoidable overlap.252
Second, the Court's statement that the case calls for no "discussion ... of substantive antitrust law"253 surely cannot mean
that raising any issues pertinent to antitrust law is per se taboo.
The Comcast majority repeatedly refers to complex questions of
antitrust law in general, and "antitrust impact" in particular, in
its opinion. 254 Third, it is well recognized that discussions concerning the merits of an expert's multivariate regression modelprecisely the discussions that the Court desired to avoid-are
substantive questions distinct from more general questions concerning the elements of an antitrust claim.55
The antitrust-injury-centric interpretation of Comcast comports with the Court's paradoxical orientation toward antitrust
law-engaging in a discussion of broad antitrust concepts while
simultaneously rebuking the dissent for discussing "substantive
antitrust law"-by relying on a threshold question of justiciability.
Antitrust injury, as noted earlier, serves as an additional,
antitrust-specific standing requirement.256 The Comcast dissent's antitrust protestations, by contrast, centered on substantive and merits-based questions of fact.257 In contrasting

250 Id, citing id at 1437-41 (Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting) (stating that the record
supports the district court's findings of fact).
251 Id at 1431, quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 131 S Ct at 2551 (noting that the lower
court had appropriately not yet reached the "merits" of the impact model's propriety, but
that some "overlap" with the merits may be necessary at the certification stage).
252 See, for example, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 131 S Ct at 2551; General Telephone Co
of the Southwest v Falcon, 457 US 147, 160 (1982).
253 Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433.
254 Id at 1433-34.
255 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 8-9
(Harvard 2005) (noting that "technical expert testimony," including "an expert's multiple
regression analysis," addresses questions of fact).
256 See notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
257 See note 218 and accompanying text.
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these two antitrust-centric approaches, this Comment's antitrustinjury interpretation of Comcast does not at all depend on
substantive discussions of antitrust law, but rather relies on
settling threshold justiciability questions. The majority opinion
is clearly willing to entertain discussions concerning "the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners' liability in this action is
premised."258

It might also be argued that this Comment's interpretation
of Comcast would severely hamper the ability of private litigants
to deploy the class action mechanism in the antitrust context.
There are three reasons why this critique should not concern the
reader. First, while this Comment's interpretation of Comcast
and Rule 23(b)(3) will substantially heighten the threshold for
antitrust-class-action certification, some antitrust classes will
still be able to satisfy the predominance inquiry by establishing
common antitrust injury.29 The feasibility of establishing common antitrust injury is a matter of empirical certainty.260 Second,

this interpretation of Comcast is certainly no more problematic
than prominent alternative interpretations, at least one of which
effectively eviscerates Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.261
Third, even if this Comment's interpretation of Comcast
erects an insurmountable barrier to antitrust class actions, the
magnitude of this problem is not immediately obvious.262 Critically, antitrust law is unique insofar as a battery of government
agencies has an equal, if not greater, ability to litigate to enforce
the law.263 While these agencies face resource constraints, one
should expect that those cases most likely to otherwise generate
private class claims to attract the most greatest-enforcement
attention. The fact that these agencies will not funnel damage
awards in the form of fines to private litigants is of little moment
258 Comcast, 133 S Ct at 1433.
259 See, for example, In re Cox Enterprises, Inc Set-Top Cable Television Box, 2014
WL 104964 at *13 (certifying a class based on evidence of harm "common to the class").
260 See, for example, In re Cathode Ray Tube, 2013 WL 5391159 at *7 (certifying an
antitrust class action after Comcast in which the proffered class presented a sufficiently
common antitrust-injury claim); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole)Antitrust Litigation, 297
FRD 168, 181 (D Mass 2013) (certifying an antitrust class action in light of Comcast by
"first address[ing]" the "antitrust impact" question in the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
inquiry and finding sufficient commonality).
261 See Part II.B.1.
262 For a discussion of the "serious drawbacks" of class actions as a means of private
antitrust enforcement, see Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 274-75 (Chicago 2d ed 2001).
263 See, for example, Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 US 398, 412 (2004). See also Theodore L. Banks, 1 DistributionLaw: Antitrust
Principlesand Practice § 1.11 at 1-198 to -200 (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed 2013).
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in ensuring antitrust law's enforcement.264 Indeed, this may buttress enforcement of the antitrust laws by removing the private
litigant's incentive to settle out of court. 265 It is worth noting that
this point counsels against an expansive reading of Comcast
outside of the antitrust context. Erecting an insurmountable
barrier to class actions outside of the antitrust context, where
government agencies are less able to seek public enforcement, is
far more troubling.
CONCLUSION

Comcast Corp v Behrend presents lower courts with nothing
less than an interpretive mystery. Nearly all that is certain
about the case are the stakes; how Comcast is interpreted will
dictate the course of Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence for years to
come. It would be an understatement to describe the resultant
lower court terrain as a mere circuit split.
However, in all of its ambiguity, Comcast presents an opportunity. This Comment challenges liability's hegemony in the
predominance inquiry and therefore allows that inquiry to better
serve its role as a costly screen. Query the extent to which this
account of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry can or should
be transplanted to other class action contexts. 266 Regardless, in
the run-of-the-mine class action, the predominance inquiry is
best served by focusing on liability, setting aside considerations
of individualized damages. In the antitrust-class-action context,
however, things are different-the crux of the claim turns on the
plaintiffs' antitrust injuries. Comcast is rightly interpreted as a
264 So long as the antitrust violator is required to internalize the cost that its actions
impose on society, it matters not for purposes of deterrence whether money is distributed
to antitrust victims, given to charities, or even burned. See Posner, Antitrust Law at 266
(cited in note 262).
265 See id at 275.
266 For example, in the securities-fraud context it may be that predominance should
be established via the economic-loss element of a securities-fraud claim. Such a claim
requires a complex measure of the economic impact that the alleged securities fraud had
on the plaintiff, designed to ensure that imposing liability deters only that behavior directly resulting in damage, rather than establishing a violation of securities laws. See
Dura Pharmaceuticals,Inc v Broudo, 544 US 336, 343 (2005) (noting that economic loss
is a critical element of a securities-fraud action because when the plaintiff simply
demonstrates a securities law violation and a deflated price, "that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances ... or other
events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower price").
See also Newton v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 259 F3d 154, 188 (3d Cir
2001) (noting that, in the securities-fraud-class-action context, "analogy to antitrust class
actions is well-taken").
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case that finally recognizes this important difference, establishing
the centrality of antitrust injury in the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
inquiry.

9

